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ABSTRACT 
Constitutional theory has long been influenced by the idea that the 
Supreme Court exercises “passive virtues,” avoiding politically divisive 
cases that threaten its legitimacy. The Article inverts the logic. Supreme 
Court Justices (and other judges too) do more than avoid divisive cases that 
could weaken the Court. They seek “unity” cases—meaning cases where 
law and politics align—that could strengthen the Court. When judges seek 
unity cases to enhance their legitimacy, they exercise active virtues.  
We develop the theory of active virtues and demonstrate its use. Our case 
studies come from the U.S. Supreme Court and tribunals worldwide, and 
they involve issues like voting, piracy, and police. Following the case 
studies, we situate active virtues in a broader theory of judicial power. 
According to our theory, courts balance divisive and unity cases like 
investors balance stocks and bonds. This portfolio theory of judicial power 
illuminates a range of topics, including docket control, activism, the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty, and the rule of law. Recognizing active 
virtues may have implications for today’s Supreme Court, which faces a 
legitimacy crisis.  
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The Supreme Court is mired in controversy. According to critics, Justice 
Gorsuch occupies a “stolen” seat, 1  Justice Kavanaugh’s testimony was 
“nakedly partisan,”2  and Justice Barrett was confirmed only eight days 
before a presidential election. 3  Commentators have advocated 
 
1. See Editorial, The Stolen Supreme Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2016), https://www.nyti 
mes.com/2016/12/24/opinion/sunday/the-stolen-supreme-court-seat.html [https://perma.cc/HB7L-634 
D].  
2. Matt Ford, Brett Kavanaugh Is the Point of No Return, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 6, 2018), https:// 
newrepublic.com/article/151597/brett-kavanaugh-confirmed-supreme-court-point-no-return [https://per 
ma.cc/XXG3-DWVK].  
3.  See Morgan Chalfant, Barrett Sworn in as Supreme Court Justice by Thomas, THE HILL 













impeachment, court packing, term limits, and other reforms.4 Chief Justice 
Roberts defended the judiciary, stating, “We do not have Obama judges or 
Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges.”5 But that did not stop the 
bleeding. President Trump fired back: “Sorry Chief Justice John Roberts, 
but you do indeed have ‘Obama judges[.]’”6 The Court’s approval ratings 
have dropped,7 Justices fret,8 and the controversial cases keep coming.9  
But not every case divides the Justices or inflames politics. Consider 
Timbs v. Indiana.10 Decided in 2019, Timbs involved the constitutionality 
of some asset forfeitures. In brief, states had been seizing valuable, personal 
property that was connected, sometimes only tangentially, to relatively 
minor crimes.11 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court invalidated 
this state practice and issued an opinion grounded in law and popular among 
politicians, interest groups, and the public.12  
What explains the persistence of cases like Timbs on the Court’s small 
and often-acrimonious docket? One possibility is that these cases are 
leftovers. The Court practices “passive virtues,” avoiding cases (or at least 
some cases) that are especially politically fraught.13 If the Justices screen 
out enough controversial cases, there are bound to be some uncontroversial 
ones left in the stack. But this may not be the whole story. We offer a 
 
4. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240, 
2240–41 (2019) (book review) (describing recent criticisms of the Court and proposals for reform).  
5. Robert Barnes, Rebuking Trump’s Criticism of ‘Obama Judge,’ Chief Justice Roberts 




6. Matthew Choi, Trump Hits Back at Chief Justice Roberts, Escalating an Extraordinary 
Exchange, POLITICO (Nov. 21, 2018, 7:29 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/21/supreme-c 
ourt-chief-justice-john-roberts-calls-out-trump-for-his-attack-on-a-judge-1011203 [https://perma.cc/6X 
RV-EU7U].  
7. See Grove, supra note 4, at 2251 n.43 (reporting an 11-point drop in the Court’s approval 
since 2001).  
8. At a public event, Justice Kagan wondered if people “realize how precious the [C]ourt’s 
legitimacy is” and worried that the Court fails to “look . . . impartial and neutral and fair.” Daniel Politi, 
Justice Kagan Fears Supreme Court Could Lose Legitimacy Without a Swing Justice, SLATE (Oct. 6, 
2018, 11:08 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/justice-elena-kagan-fears-supreme-court 
-could-lose-legitimacy-without-a-swing-justice.html [https://perma.cc/G5SV-X9Y5]. 
9. See, e.g., Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (prohibiting by a 5–4 vote 
public sector unions from requiring non-union members to pay fees); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 
(2018) (upholding by a 5–4 vote the travel ban); Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) 
(holding by a 5–4 vote that partisan gerrymandering claims are non-justiciable).  
10. Timbs v. Louisiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019). 
11. See generally id. 
12. See infra Section II.C. 
13. See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986) 
(developing the theory of passive virtues). For examples of the Court avoiding cases, see infra notes 80–
94 and accompanying text. 











different account of Timbs, one that transforms it and similar disputes from 
leftovers to crucial players in the judicial enterprise.  
Legitimacy is central to courts’ power. Judges rely on other actors to 
comply, often voluntarily, with their decisions. Nebulous though it may 
seem, legitimacy drives that compliance. 14  To build and sustain their 
legitimacy, courts exercise passive virtues, avoiding some “divisive” cases 
where law and politics collide.15 But they do not stop there. Courts also 
attract “unity” cases, meaning cases where law and politics align. When 
courts seek unity cases to enhance judicial legitimacy, they exercise active 
virtues.16  
Timbs is a recent example of a unity case. The Justices resolved a dispute 
about an unpopular state practice in a way that cast the Court in a positive 
light. Now consider a second unity case, Harper v. Virginia Board of 
Elections.17 Decided in 1966, Harper involved the constitutionality of state 
poll taxes. By the time of the case, federal poll taxes had been banned, most 
state poll taxes had been eliminated, and Congress had indicated its 
opposition to those that remained.18 Yet a few recalcitrant states refused to 
give. The Supreme Court invalidated all poll taxes, issuing (as in Timbs) an 
opinion grounded in law and popular among officials and voters.19  
Timbs and Harper are unity cases, and we believe deciding them grew 
the Court’s legitimacy. However, we are not certain the Court took them for 
that reason.20 Recent controversies notwithstanding, the modern Supreme 
Court may have enough legitimacy that deliberately practicing active 
virtues is unnecessary. But things were different for the early Supreme 
Court. While riding circuit in the 1800s, Justice Story manufactured 
 
14. See infra Part I. 
15. See generally BICKEL, supra note 13. 
16. Other scholars have used this term, but not with this meaning. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, 
The Active Virtues, REGULATION (Jan. 1985) at 14, 18 (endorsing judicial activism to protect economic 
interests); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 1043 
(2008) (arguing that courts should exercise “active virtues” and engage in constitutional showdowns 
when the gains from clarifying law outweigh the losses from institutional conflict); David M. Driesen, 
Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 808, 890 (2004) (labeling efforts to address the merits of a case “active virtues”); 
Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of Unlimited 
Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 358 (2011) (labeling as “active virtues” the “forthright confrontation of merits 
issues raised by common law litigation”); Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional 
Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 927–35 (2005) (labeling the unnecessary resolution of constitutional 
questions “active virtues”); Ruti Teitel, Post-Communist Constitutionalism: A Transitional Perspective, 
26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 167, 185 (1994) (describing as “active virtues” quick, pre-enactment 
judicial review in countries undergoing political transitions).  
17. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).  
18. See infra Section II.C.  
19. See infra Section II.C. 
20. In fact, the Court had mandatory jurisdiction in Harper, so it had no choice in taking the case. 












disagreements in lower courts to push cases to the Supreme Court.21 We will 
argue that some of these were unity cases and that Justice Story deliberately 
practiced active virtues.  
Active virtues are not confined to the United States. This strategy of 
legitimation is a global phenomenon. The Supreme Court of India converted 
a newspaper article into a petition and a popular decision on bonded labor.22 
In Mexico, the Supreme Court bypassed an intermediate court and seized a 
high-profile case involving women mistreated by police.23 We present these 
case studies and others, categorizing and uniting seemingly disparate court 
practices under the heading of active virtues.  
In addition to describing active virtues, we situate their exercise in a 
theory of judicial power. Legitimacy depends on how courts decide cases.24 
Judges’ decisions can be faithful or unfaithful to law, popular or unpopular 
with the public, acceptable or repugnant to state actors, and so on. Alexander 
Bickel argued that courts avoid cases that poison the mixture—cases like 
Naim v. Naim, which involved miscegenation in 1950s Virginia and pit law 
against politics.25 We argue that courts attract cases that get the mixture 
right. Under our theory, judges balance divisive and unity cases like 
investors balance stocks and bonds. Thus, we call this the portfolio theory 
of judicial power. A good portfolio preserves the court’s legitimacy by 
offsetting divisive cases with unity cases.  
These ideas may have implications for today’s Supreme Court. They 
point to a strategy that the Justices could follow (and, perhaps, that they are 
trying to follow already) to promote the institution’s reputation. But the 
ideas have broader reach. The legitimacy problem is not limited to Roberts’s 
Court—lower courts and state courts struggle with it too—and nor is it 
confined to the United States. Courts everywhere struggle to establish their 
legitimacy.26 Scholars have shown that foreign courts practice the passive 
virtues.27 Similarly, we show that foreign courts—in India, Mexico, and 
elsewhere—practice active virtues.28 Thus, active virtues and the portfolio 
theory are not idiosyncratic features of the U.S. Supreme Court. They are 
general strategies of judicial power.  
The idea of passive virtues is old and influential. Why did it take decades 
to develop its inverse and combine the two halves into a comprehensive 
 
21. See infra Section III.A.1.  
22. See infra Section III.A.4.  
23. See infra Section III.A.2.  
24. For a discussion, see NUNO GAROUPA & TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REPUTATION: A 
COMPARATIVE THEORY 14–49 (2015) (arguing that compliance depends on judges’ reputations, which 
depend in part on judicial decisions). Legitimacy depends on other factors too. See infra Part I.  
25. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam). See generally BICKEL, supra note 13.  
26. See infra Section I.D. 
27. See infra Section I.D. 
28. See infra Section III.A. 











theory of judicial legitimation? We believe the explanation lies in rushed 
logic. Bickel concluded that passivity promotes legitimacy, so scholars have 
concluded that behaving actively must undermine legitimacy. But that is not 
necessarily true. Scholars have held the mirror to Bickel at the wrong angle. 
We changed the tilt to reflect Bickel’s premise, not his conclusion. His 
premise was that cases in the stormy seas of law and politics weaken courts. 
The inverse is that cases in calm waters empower courts. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews literature on judicial 
legitimacy and connects it to avoidance. Part II presents the theory of active 
virtues. Part III develops a typology of case attraction strategies and 
provides examples from the United States, Mexico, and elsewhere. Part IV 
situates active virtues in a broader conceptual and normative theory of 
courts.  
I. LEGITIMACY AND AVOIDANCE 
“The judiciary,” Hamilton wrote, “has no influence over either the sword 
or the purse.”29 Thus, it “depend[s] upon the aid of the executive arm even 
for the efficacy of its judgments.”30 Hamilton’s short phrase identifies a 
deep predicament. Courts act in the name of the law. They tell others, 
including powerful presidents and legislators, what they can and cannot do. 
Yet courts have no mechanism for actuating their decisions. They cannot 
arrest, imprison, or collect fines. President Jackson captured it with a 
famous quip about Chief Justice Marshall: “[he] has made his decision; now 
let him enforce it!”31 
Notwithstanding President Jackson, many officials in many contexts 
comply with judges’ orders. Why? Under what conditions will “people with 
money and guns ever submit to people armed only with gavels?”32 Scholars 
have offered many answers.33 We focus on one theme from this literature: 
 
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).  
30. Id.  
31. See, e.g., Edwin A. Miles, After John Marshall’s Decision: Worcester v. Georgia and the 
Nullification Crisis, 39 J.S. HIST. 519, 519 (1973) (emphasis omitted).  
32. Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . . ”: The Political Foundations of 
Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 60 (2003). 
33. See generally id.; ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES 139–50 (2000); TOM 
GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (2003); MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, 
ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION 149–83 (2002); MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A 
COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981); THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: COURTS, 
POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC (Bruce Peabody ed., 2011); DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY: THE 
ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION OF COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES (Siri Gloppen, Roberto Gargarella & 
Elin Skaar eds., 2004); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY (2004); JODI S. FINKEL, JUDICIAL 
REFORM AS POLITICAL INSURANCE: ARGENTINA, PERU, AND MEXICO IN THE 1990S (2008); REBECCA 













judicial legitimacy. This concept underpins our original claims, which we 
develop beginning in Part II.  
A. The Meaning of Legitimacy 
What is legitimacy? The term is loaded, and scholars use it in different 
ways.34  We focus on one particular form of legitimacy: sociological. 35 
Institutions have sociological legitimacy when people accept them and obey 
their decisions.36 Sociological legitimacy is closely tied to public support.37  
 
(2004); CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); Pierre Landry, The Institutional Diffusion of Courts in China: 
Evidence from Survey Data, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 
207 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008); Beatriz Magaloni, Enforcing the Autocratic Political 
Order and the Role of Courts: The Case of Mexico, in RULE BY LAW, supra, at 180; Silvia Inclán 
Oseguera, Judicial Reform in Mexico: Political Insurance or the Search for Political Legitimacy? 62 
POL. RSCH. Q. 753 (2009); Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries Adopt Judicial Review?, 
30 J.L. ECON. ORG. 587 (2014); F. Andrew Hanssen, Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial 
Independence?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 712 (2004); Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of Judicial 
Empowerment Through Constitutionalization: Lessons from Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 91 (2000); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an 
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling 
(In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994); Keith E. 
Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by 
the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583 (2005); James R. Rogers, Information and 
Judicial Review: A Signaling Game of Legislative-Judicial Interaction, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 84 (2001); 
Stefan Voigt & Eli M. Salzberger, Choosing Not to Choose: When Politicians Choose to Delegate 
Powers, 55 KYKLOS 289 (2002); Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation 
of Powers, or: Why Do We Have an Independent Judiciary?, 13 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 349 (1993); 
Jeffrey K. Staton & Will H. Moore, Judicial Power in Domestic and International Politics, 65 INT’L 
ORG. 553 (2011); Juan F. González-Bertomeu, Judicial Politics in Latin America, in ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA (Rachel Sieder, Karina Ansolabehere & Tatiana 
Alfonso eds., 2019); Georg Vanberg, Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to 
Constitutional Review, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 346 (2001); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENT, THE SUPREME COURT, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (2007).  
34. In brief, “legal” legitimacy means an institution makes decisions grounded in law, while 
“moral” legitimacy means an institution makes morally correct decisions. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1794–1800 (2005) (contrasting legal and 
moral legitimacy). Fallon also distinguishes sociological legitimacy. See id. See generally RICHARD H. 
FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT (2018). 
35. See Fallon, supra note 34, at 1794–1800 (distinguishing sociological legitimacy from other 
forms of legitimacy). Sociological legitimacy traces to Weber. See generally MAX WEBER, THE THEORY 
OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (Talcott Parsons ed., A.M Henderson & Talcott Parsons 
trans., 1964).  
36. See Fallon, supra note 34, at 1795–96 (defining sociological legitimacy). 
37. Id. at 1795 (“[Sociological] legitimacy signifies an active belief by citizens . . . that particular 
claims to authority deserve respect or obedience . . . .”). Cf. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: 
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 373, 374 (2007) (warning 
against interpretations of the Constitution that diverge from convictions of the public). 











Political scientists divide the sociological legitimacy of courts into two 
parts, “diffuse” and “specific.” 38  Courts enjoy diffuse legitimacy when 
citizens have a “reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will” towards 
them.39 That reservoir is the product of fundamental values, like citizens’ 
commitments to democracy, judicial independence, and the separation of 
powers.40 Courts also enjoy diffuse legitimacy when citizens perceive their 
judgments to be sincere and principled.41 Courts enjoy specific legitimacy 
when citizens are satisfied with their performance.42 Specific legitimacy 
depends on the fit between case outputs and public opinion.43  
Some research suggests that diffuse and specific legitimacy are 
independent. If citizens value democracy, then courts enjoy diffuse 
legitimacy—even if they make unpopular decisions that undercut their 
specific legitimacy.44 Other research finds connections between these forms 
of legitimacy. On one account, people keep a “running tally” of judicial 
decisions.45 Popular decisions generate specific legitimacy that translates 
gradually into diffuse legitimacy.46 On another account, the translation is 
immediate. Ideological disagreement with court decisions translates directly 
into lower diffuse legitimacy. 47  To illustrate, when the Supreme Court 
 
38. See, e.g., James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the US Supreme Court: 
Conventional Wisdoms and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 201, 204–05 
(2014). 
39. Id. at 204.  
40. See id. at 206 (“[F]undamental political values—particularly support for democratic 
institutions and processes—serve as the most important predictors of diffuse support . . . .”); Gregory A. 
Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
635, 636 (1992) (“[B]road political values—commitment to social order and support for democratic 
norms—do a good job of predicting attitudes toward the Supreme Court.”). 
41. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195, 213 (2011) (arguing that a court’s legitimacy is not 
undermined if citizens believe that judges exercise their discretion in a principled manner).  
42. See Gibson & Nelson, supra note 38, at 205 (defining specific legitimacy as “satisfaction 
with the performance of a political institution”). 
43. See id.  
44. See Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 40, at 636 (“[W]e find no connection between support for 
specific policies and diffuse support for the Supreme Court.”).  
45. Gibson & Nelson, supra note 38, at 206. 
46. For a summary, see id. at 206–07. See also Vanessa A. Baird, Building Institutional 
Legitimacy: The Role of Procedural Justice, 54 POL. RSCH. Q. 333 (2001) (developing this theory); 
James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Vanessa A. Baird, On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 
92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 356 (1998) (studying judicial legitimacy worldwide and observing that 
“satisfaction [with individual decisions] slowly evolves into institutional legitimacy”); James W. 
Stoutenborough & Donald P. Haider-Markel, Public Confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court: A New Look 
at the Impact of Court Decisions, 45 SOC. SCI. J. 28, 29 (2008) (finding that individual decisions can 
impact confidence in the Supreme Court).  
47. Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme 
Court Legitimacy in the American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 197 (2013) (“[T]he Court’s 
legitimacy is significantly influenced by what the Court does in policymaking terms and whether 












upheld the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act, its diffuse 
legitimacy suffered among conservatives and grew among liberals.48 
Judges sympathize with the latter view. They worry that individual 
decisions can affect their public standing. Consider Bush v. Gore.49 Five 
conservative Justices—who tend to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment 
narrowly and defer to states—found an equal protection violation in 
Florida’s vote counting procedures.50 They refused to give the state a chance 
to remedy the problem.51 Their decision made Bush, a conservative, the next 
President.52 In dissent, four liberal Justices waffled on the equal protection 
violation and would have given Florida flexibility—in other words, they 
would have given the liberal candidate Gore another chance. 53  Justice 
Stevens feared the decision would undercut “the Nation’s confidence in the 
judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.”54 According to Justice 
Breyer, the decision “runs the risk of undermining the public’s confidence 
in the Court.”55  
For a more recent example, consider again the Affordable Care Act. In 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,56 Chief Justice 
Roberts apparently switched his vote and upheld the individual mandate out 
of fear for the Court’s reputation.57 In the Court’s most recent term, Roberts 
repeatedly forged bipartisan opinions on LGBTQ rights, DACA, abortion, 
 
48. See Dino P. Christenson & David M. Glick, Chief Justice Roberts’s Health Care Decision 
Disrobed: The Microfoundations of the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 403, 415–16 
(2015). For an opposing view, see James L. Gibson, Miguel M. Pereira & Jeffrey Ziegler, Updating 
Supreme Court Legitimacy: Testing the “Rule, Learn, Update” Model of Political Communication, 45 
AM. POL. RSCH. 980 (2017).  
49. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). For analysis of Bush v. Gore and judicial 
legitimacy, see Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE. 
L.J. 1407, 1450–58 (2001). 
50. Bush, 531 U.S. at 100–11. The opinion is per curiam, but all four liberal Justices dissented. 
See id. at 123–58.  
51. See id. at 110–11.  
52. The Justices halted the recount while Bush was ahead. If they had permitted the recount, 
Bush likely would have won. See Wade Payson-Denney, So, Who Really Won? What the Bush v. Gore 
Studies Showed, CNN (Oct. 31, 2015, 10:06 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/31/politics/bush-gore-
2000-election-results-studies/index.html [https://perma.cc/G3DH-JB6V]. 
53. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 123–58.  
54. Id. at 129 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
55. Id. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer continued: “That confidence is a public 
treasure. It has been built slowly over many years . . . . It is a vitally necessary ingredient of any 
successful effort to protect basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself.” Id. at 157–58. According to 
one study, Bush v. Gore did not affect the Court’s legitimacy. See James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira 
& Lester Kenyatta Spence, The Supreme Court and the US Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-
Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535, 535 (2003) (“Evidence from our survey, conducted 
in early 2001, suggests little if any diminution of the Court’s legitimacy in the aftermath of Bush v. Gore 
. . . .”).  
56. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).  
57. See, e.g., Grove, supra note 4, at 2243 (describing a common view of Roberts’s vote).  











and presidential subpoenas.58 According to one observer, the Chief Justice 
“work[ed] with his colleagues to maintain the Court’s bipartisan legitimacy 
at a time when the other branches have lost their own.”59 
We adopt the judges’ view. We assume that courts’ diffuse legitimacy 
depends in part on their individual decisions in individual cases. 60  To 
simplify language, we will henceforth use the term “legitimacy” to mean 
courts’ diffuse legitimacy.61  
B. The Value of Legitimacy 
Justice O’Connor in Planned Parenthood v. Casey wrote that the 
“Court’s power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance and 
perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary.”62 
To translate, legitimacy breeds respect. People are more likely to comply 
with judicial decisions, including unpopular ones, when they consider the 
court legitimate. 63  Thus, legitimacy substitutes for the purse and the 
sword.64  
The value of legitimacy is highest for courts that routinely hear cases 
against the most powerful authorities of a state. But legitimacy can also be 
an important asset for lower courts. Because supreme and constitutional 
courts hear a small fraction of filed petitions, most cases end in the lower 
courts. Operating as de facto courts of last resort, these courts face the same 
challenges that supreme and constitutional courts confront—including the 
challenge of securing compliance with their decisions. Thus, although most 
 
58. See Jeffrey Rosen, John Roberts Is Just Who the Supreme Court Needed, THE ATLANTIC 
(July 13, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/john-roberts-just-who-supreme-co 
urt-needed/614053/ [https://perma.cc/W4LF-SPJP].  
59. Id. 
60. The language “in part” matters. We do not claim that judicial decisions explain diffuse 
legitimacy in toto. Factors like citizens’ commitment to democracy might matter, as might judicial 
elections. See, e.g., JAMES L. GIBSON, ELECTING JUDGES: THE SURPRISING EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGNING 
ON JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY (2012) (connecting elections to legitimacy). Our claim is that judicial 
decisions matter some for legitimacy. The opposing view—judicial decisions, however bad, do not affect 
legitimacy—seems implausible.  
61. Legitimacy in our sense relates to what others call reputation. See generally GAROUPA & 
GINSBURG, supra note 24.  
62. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).  
63. See, e.g., Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 40, at 635 (“To persist and function effectively, 
political institutions must continuously try to amass and husband the goodwill of the public.”); Bartels 
& Johnston, supra note 47, at 184 (“For an institution like the Supreme Court to render rulings that carry 
authoritative force, it must maintain a sufficient reservoir of institutional legitimacy, or diffuse support, 
with the American public and the other branches of government.”). See generally WALTER F. MURPHY, 
ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 12 (1964).  
64. We claim legitimacy improves compliance with some decisions, not that it ensures 
compliance with all decisions. Cf. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 













of the examples in this Article come from supreme and constitutional courts, 
legitimacy matters (and our claims about legitimacy hold) for many lower 
courts as well. 
How exactly does legitimacy cause compliance? One mechanism is 
psychological. When people perceive an institution as legitimate, they feel 
obligated to comply with its decisions, even when they disagree.65 Much 
research supports this claim.66  A second, complementary mechanism is 
political. If the public perceives a court as legitimate, then defying it comes 
with a political price. When the Supreme Court ordered President Nixon to 
release his audiotapes,67 Nixon could not refuse.68 When the Court resolved 
the 2000 election in favor of Bush, Gore had to acquiesce.69 In both cases 
the public pressure was too intense. Under this account “the public acts as 
an indirect enforcement mechanism.”70  
C. Legitimacy and the Passive Virtues 
Legitimacy brings power: people comply with decisions from a 
legitimate court. Thus, judges have an incentive to maintain and grow their 
legitimacy.71 Recall that legitimacy probably depends—and judges believe 
it depends—in part on individual decisions. This raises a question: how can 
judges resolve cases in legitimacy-enhancing ways?  
Later we will address this question at length.72 For now, consider just 
two broad and important factors: law and politics. When courts make 
 
65. See Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. 
REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 377–78 (2006).  
66. For a review, see id.  
67. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).  
68. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOR 64–65 (2006) (suggesting that the Court’s diffuse support discouraged Nixon from ignoring 
the Court’s decision); Diana Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein & Robert A. Kagan, Conclusion (same), 
in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS: JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 398, 402–03 (Diana 
Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein & Robert A. Kagan eds., 2013). 
69. See Kapiszewski et al., supra note 68, at 402 (discussing pressure on Gore).  
70. Clifford James Carrubba, A Model of the Endogenous Development of Judicial Institutions 
in Federal and International Systems, 71 J. POL. 55, 56 (2009). For other work on the public as an 
enforcer, see JEFFREY K. STATON, JUDICIAL POWER AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN MEXICO 22–
46 (2010); Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial Legitimacy, 53 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 971 (2009); GEORG VANBERG, THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW IN GERMANY 
19–60 (2005); Matthew C. Stephenson, Court of Public Opinion: Government Accountability and 
Judicial Independence, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 379 (2004); and Vanberg, supra note 33. 
71. We should be careful not to overstate the case. Collective action problems might discourage 
individual judges from working to enhance their court’s legitimacy. See BAUM, supra note 68, at 65 
(observing that legitimacy is a collective benefit for a court, not an individual benefit that accrues to 
judges); see also Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 915, 964 (2005) (“Empire-building by judges is clearly far from a universal tendency.”). But see 
David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2018) 
(arguing that institutional loyalty can be elicited through institutional design). 
72. See infra Part II.  











decisions grounded in law—legal sources and norms support their 
decisions, and lawyers and other observers know it—their legitimacy 
presumably grows. Likewise, when courts make decisions that enjoy 
political support their legitimacy again grows.  
 This gets us to Alexander Bickel. He lacked insights from contemporary 
social science, but he understood the importance of legitimacy.73 In The 
Least Dangerous Branch, Bickel concentrated on cases that threatened the 
Supreme Court’s legitimacy by making the Justices choose between law and 
politics. He used race discrimination to illustrate: 
[Judicial review empowers the Supreme Court to] proclaim the 
absolute principle that race is not an allowable criterion for legislative 
classification. The principle as such permits no principled flexibility 
. . . . But at the same time, it cannot in our society constitute a hard 
and fast rule of action for universal immediate execution. This is 
nothing to be proud of. It is a disagreeable fact, and it cannot be 
wished away. . . . [H]ow does the Court, charged with enunciating 
principle, produce or permit the necessary compromises?74 
We can restate Bickel’s question in our language: how could the 
Supreme Court circa 1960 resolve a case on race discrimination without 
threatening its legitimacy? A legal decision would inflame politics. A 
political decision would undercut law.  
The solution, Bickel argued, is to avoid the dispute.75 Using standing, 
ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine, the Supreme Court 
can sidestep contentious cases. 76  This allows the Court to stand on 
principle—“we lack jurisdiction”—without taking a position on politically 
charged issues. 77  According to Bickel, avoidance is the “secret of [the 
 
73. BICKEL, supra note 13, at 30 (“Legitimacy, being the stability of a good government over 
time, is the fruit of consent to specific actions or to the authority to act . . . .”); see also Alexander M. 
Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term–Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 75, 77 
(1961) (reflecting on the “inner vulnerability” of courts, which have “no earth to draw strength from” 
and suggesting that the court should use avoidance techniques to “guard its integrity”); ALEXANDER M. 
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 90 (1978) (“The Supreme Court’s 
judgments may be put forth as universally prescriptive; but they actually become so only when they gain 
widespread assent. They bind of their own force no one but the parties to a litigation. To realize the 
promise that all others similarly situated will be similarly bound, the Court’s judgments need the assent 
and the cooperation first of the political institutions, and ultimately of the people.”).  
74. BICKEL, supra note 13, at 69.  
75. Bickel, supra note 73, at 50 (“The Court exists in the Lincolnian tension between principle 
and expediency. . . . The Court is able to play its full role . . . because at least in modern time it nearly 
always has three courses of action open to it: it may strike down legislation as inconsistent with principle; 
it may legitimate it; or it may do neither.”). 
76. See generally BICKEL, supra note 13 at 111–98.  
77. We tie justiciability doctrines to jurisdiction. A recent paper argues that one of those doctrines 













Court’s] ability to maintain itself in the tension between principle and 
expediency.”78 He called avoidance techniques the “passive virtues.”79 
To demonstrate the passive virtues, consider Naim, which we mentioned 
above. The case involved Ruby Elaine, a white woman, and Han Say Naim, 
an Asian man.80 They traveled from Virginia to North Carolina, got married, 
and then returned to Virginia.81 When Ruby sought an annulment a year 
later, she had state law on her side. Virginia’s code forbade interracial 
marriage.82 Han Say opposed the annulment, and he had federal law on his 
side. The Supreme Court had just decided Brown, invalidating laws that 
segregated public schools by race.83 If states could not separate races at 
school, presumably they could not separate them at the altar.84 When Naim 
reached the Supreme Court, the Justices faced competing pressures.85 Laws 
prohibiting interracial marriage were probably unconstitutional,86 but they 
were widespread and popular.87 Rather than inflame politics or undercut 
precedent, the Court simply avoided the case.88  
Beyond segregation, the Supreme Court has avoided cases on many 
contentious issues, including the pledge of allegiance,89 direct democracy,90 
 
(2017); see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1908, 1911, 1915–39 (2015) (explaining that historically the political question doctrine was 
factual, not jurisdictional).  
78. BICKEL, supra note 13, at 69.  
79. Id. at 111–98.  
80. See Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 750 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).  
81. See id.  
82. See id. at 750–51. 
83. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
84. See Richard Delgado, Naim v. Naim, 12 NEV. L.J. 525, 525 (2012) (“[I]f school segregation 
is unconstitutional, separating the races on the marriage altar would appear to be so as well.”).  
85. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (per curiam), vacating 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955).  
86. Virginia’s highest court upheld the law on grounds anathema to the principle, if not the 
precise holding, in Brown. Compare Brown, 347 U.S. at 483 (holding racial segregation in education to 
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), with Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 756 (“We 
are unable to read in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution . . . any words . . . which prohibit 
the State from enacting legislation to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens, or which denies the 
power of the State to regulate the marriage relation so that it shall not have a mongrel breed of citizens.”).  
87. See Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 755 (noting that over half the states had anti-miscegenation laws); 
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 321 (2004) (“[O]pinion polls in the 1950s 
revealed that over 90 percent of whites, even outside the South, opposed interracial marriage.”).  
88. Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1956) (per curiam) (declining to decide the case on the merits 
and remanding to state court). 
89. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (avoiding a decision on whether 
the expression “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance endorses religion). 
90. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (avoiding deciding whether 
Oregon’s direct democracy violates the Guarantee Clause). 











LGBTQ discrimination,91  English-only laws,92  abortion rights,93  and the 
Vietnam War.94 Sometimes the Court uses the avoidance techniques Bickel 
emphasized, like standing and ripeness, and other times it simply denies 
certiorari.95  
Avoidance is not foolproof. Dodging a case, especially after years of 
litigation below, wastes resources and stunts the development of law.96 It 
can undermine the Court’s reputation for protecting constitutional rights and 
resolving salient problems.97 Thus, avoidance might do more harm than 
good—it might shrink a court’s legitimacy rather than grow it. 98 
Furthermore, Bickel’s theory is hard to prove. Courts might avoid cases for 
all kinds of reasons: to reduce their workload,99 to concentrate on preferred 
issues, 100  to avoid setting a precedent in the absence of reliable 
 
91. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (dismissing an appeal from a state court decision 
adverse to same-sex marriage “for want of a substantial federal question”).  
92. See LISA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAYING IT SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD 
CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAW 17–33 (2001) (describing the Court’s refusal to hear a 
challenge to Arizona’s English-only law).  
93. Stenehjem v. MKB Mgmt. Corp., 136 S. Ct. 981 (2016) (mem.) (denying certiorari).  
94. See generally Rodric B. Schoen, A Strange Silence: Vietnam and the Supreme Court, 33 
WASHBURN L.J. 275, 278–303 (1994) (discussing passive virtues and the war).  
95. Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term–Foreword: The Court’s Agenda–and the 
Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2006) (discussing how the Court sometimes denies certiorari in cases 
where officials and constituents have intense preferences). 
96. See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 92, at 13–16 (summarizing arguments against avoidance). 
97. See DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 56 
(1980) (avoidance can “damage the Court’s credibility because the Court is popularly perceived as a 
guardian of constitutional rights”); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 259–60 (1991) (describing a Justice’s view that the Court must take 
certain cases because of the “public hue and cry” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
98. See Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: Some Interactions 
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 217 (1968) (“[E]very decision not to decide, 
just like decisions on the constitutional merits, may result either in adding to the reservoir of public 
acceptance . . . or in depleting that accumulation.”); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive 
Virtues”—A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964) 
(making the same point); Gretchen Helmke & Jeffrey K. Staton, The Puzzling Judicial Politics of Latin 
America (arguing that prudence may not be appropriate as it suggests “inaccurate beliefs about judicial 
preferences” and that the court is “unwilling to defend rights”), in COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA 306, 325 
(Gretchen Helmke & Julio Ríos-Figueroa eds., 2011). 
99. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody 
Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 20 (1993) (discussing “the influence of leisure-seeking on judicial 
behavior”).  
100. See, e.g., RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME COURT’S 
AGENDA: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 26 (1991) (“[T]he primary 
determinant for the selection of individual cases by individual justices is the values and attitudes of the 












information,101 and so on.102 Bickel’s theory holds when courts avoid cases 
for the specific purpose of preserving legitimacy.103  
Despite these challenges, Bickel seems to have gotten it more-or-less 
right. At least some of the time, the Supreme Court avoids cases to protect 
its legitimacy.104 Many observers favor this strategy.105 As Justice Brandeis 
said, “The most important thing we do is not doing.”106 
D. Passive Virtues Worldwide 
Bickel focused on the U.S. Supreme Court, but his argument applies 
elsewhere. Lower federal courts and state courts struggle to legitimize 
themselves.107 In fact, Bickel’s argument might have extra force in these 
settings and, especially, in foreign courts. In new and faltering democracies, 
where judicial independence and the rule of law are aspirational, judges 
walk a tightrope.108 They could learn from Bickel.  
 
101. See generally Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006) 
(explaining that establishing precedents resembles drafting rules and that drafting rules is difficult when 
the future events those rules will govern are uncertain). 
102. Courts might avoid cases to prevent adverse dispositions. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 97, at 
198–212 (describing “defensive denials” and “aggressive grants,” where Justices deny/grant certiorari 
because they oppose/support the likely outcome); see also Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, 
Supreme Court Justices as Strategic Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the 
Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 824 (1995) (finding evidence that the Supreme Court engages in “aggressive 
grants”). The Court might also avoid cases to discourage congressional action. See, e.g., Anna Harvey 
& Barry Friedman, Ducking Trouble: Congressionally Induced Selection Bias in the Supreme Court’s 
Agenda, 71 J. POL. 574 (2009) (finding evidence that the Court is less likely to take a case when its 
preferred outcome deviates from Congress’s). 
103. That the Supreme Court avoids cases for many reasons may explain why its use of avoidance 
seems erratic. See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 92, at 272 (criticizing the Court’s “inconsistent use of the 
malleable avoidance methods”).  
104. See Greg Goelzhauser, Avoiding Constitutional Cases, 39 AM. POL. RSCH. 483 (2011); LEE 
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 82–85 (1998).  
105. See generally BICKEL, supra note 13; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). 
106. BICKEL, supra note 13, at 71.  
107. Gibson & Nelson, supra note 39, at 202 n.3 (“[N]early every claim we make about the 
legitimacy of the Supreme Court applies with equal if not greater force to the lower federal courts. We 
note as well that concern for judicial legitimacy extends far beyond the US Supreme Court, with a great 
deal of contemporary interest in how state courts acquire and maintain legitimacy, for example.”). 
108. On the challenges foreign courts face in sustaining their independence, see generally 
NATHAN J. BROWN, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD: COURTS IN EGYPT AND THE GULF (1997); 
COURTS IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 98; COURTS AND POWER IN LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA (Siri 
Gloppen, Bruce M. Wilson, Roberto Gargarella, Elin Skaar & Morten Kinander eds., 2010); RULE BY 
LAW, supra at note 33; HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN POST-
COMMUNIST EUROPE (2000); BEYOND HIGH COURTS: THE JUSTICE COMPLEX IN LATIN AMERICA 
(Matthew C. Ingram & Diana Kapiszewski eds., 2019). 











Consider the First Russian Constitutional Court. Established in 1991, the 
court formally enjoyed independence and broad jurisdiction.109 However, 
the court had no reservoir of goodwill. 110  Citizens and officials were 
unaccustomed to an independent, powerful judiciary. 111  The court 
immediately waded in to the political thicket, making controversial 
decisions on executive power and federalism.112 Two years after the court’s 
creation—and after some of its decisions were ignored—President Yeltsin 
suspended it.113  
The Second Russian Constitutional Court fared better. Rather than 
“itching for a political fight,” the court in its early years avoided the 
contentious issue of executive power. 114  Instead, it focused on “safer” 
issues.115 As one Justice put it, the court had to “find a stable niche in the 
state machinery” by developing its “prestige and status.”116 The court has 
operated continuously since 1995.117  
Scholars have generalized this idea.118 Many courts around the world 
lack legitimacy. 119  To be effective they must change that, and passive 
virtues can help. David Fontana argues that docket control is “crucial”120 for 
new courts and helps older courts endure.121 Courts in countries like Brazil, 
Germany, Israel, Australia, Hungary, Poland, and Canada have used passive 
virtues to avoid “polarizing” cases that generate “political toxins.”122 Under 
this account, avoidance techniques are not handy but idiosyncratic tools of 
 
109. See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional Courts in the 
Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117, 
135–36 (2001) (describing the court’s features).  
110. In a 1993 survey, only ten percent of Russians trusted the court. See id. at 144.  
111. See id. at 135.  
112. See id. at 135–52. 
113. See id. at 136–37. Yeltsin said the court “has found itself in a deep state of crisis.” Id. at 137.  
114. Id. at 153–54. The court avoided ruling on some issues of executive power, and on others it 
sided with the executive. See id. at 154 n.45.  
115. See id. at 152–53.  
116. Id. at 153.  
117. See generally, History of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, CONST. CT. 
RUSS. FED’N, http://www.ksrf.ru/en/Info/History/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/8YN6-KHZ6] 
(providing a history of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation from the Court’s English 
version website). See also CARLA L THORSON, POLITICS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE RUSSIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 156 (2012) (“This constitutional court has been continuously functioning since 
1995 (at the time of writing, 16 years)[.]”). 
118. See, e.g., Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative 
Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1 (2016) (analyzing foreign courts’ efforts to avoid some contentious cases); 
David Fontana, Docket Control and the Success of Constitutional Courts, in COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 624 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (same); Jed Odermatt, 
Patterns of Avoidance: Political Questions Before International Courts, 14 INT. J.L. CONTEXT 221 
(2018) (same).  
119. See Fontana, supra note 118, at 629–30.  
120. Id. at 630.  
121. Id. at 626–30.  












the U.S. Supreme Court. They are universal features of good judicial 
design.123  
II. LEGITIMACY AND ATTRACTION 
The theory of passive virtues reduces to a sentence: courts can, do, and 
should avoid divisive cases to preserve their legitimacy. We accept that 
general argument, and our central claim grows from its inverse. If divisive 
cases, meaning cases where law and politics collide, tend to harm courts, 
then unity cases, meaning cases where law and politics align, should tend to 
help them. When courts draw in unity cases to burnish their legitimacy, they 
exercise active virtues. The following sections develop this argument.  
A. Defining Active Virtues 
Avoidance occurs when a court evades a case, as the Supreme Court did 
in Naim. Case attraction is the opposite. It occurs when a court seeks a case. 
Simply “facing” cases, meaning resolving them as they come, does not 
constitute case attraction.  
As discussed, courts avoid cases for different reasons: to reduce their 
workload, to concentrate on preferred issues, and so on. Likewise, judges 
might attract cases for different reasons. They might seek cases to clarify 
law, resolve important policy questions, and address matters that they find 
interesting. Promised anonymity, one U.S. Supreme Court Justice said the 
following:  
I had spent several terms looking for a case that presented this issue 
pretty well. I think _____ was one of the most important cases we 
have done in the _____ years I’ve been on the Court. . . . I think that 
[doctrine as it developed] is extremely important. That’s the sort of 
thing I do sometimes. I look for cases.124  
We do not focus on the kind of case attraction expressed by the Justice.125 
We do not focus on case attraction generally. Instead, we focus on active 
virtues, meaning case attraction with the goal of enhancing judicial 
legitimacy.  
The word “goal” implies intent. Sometimes judges might choose cases 
with the specific intent to grow their legitimacy. To do so, judges might start 
by identifying relevant audiences, finding out their preferences, and making 
an informed prediction about whether a particular decision will satisfy 
 
123. See id. at 626. 
124. PERRY, supra note 97, at 208 (alteration in original).  
125. This is an aggressive grant. See id. at 207–12.  











them.126 When judges do this, of course they exercise active virtues. But the 
concept need not be so demanding. A judge need not formulate a plan. She 
might simply rely on intuitions, sensing that a case presents an opportunity 
for her court and so choosing to adjudicate it. This counts as an exercise in 
active virtues.  
B. On Unity Cases 
For active virtues to work, judges must be able to identify unity cases. 
What makes a case unifying and therefore legitimacy-enhancing?127 Earlier 
we gestured at two broad and important factors: law and politics. Here we 
put flesh on them.  
For us, law and politics are scalar variables that characterize a judicial 
decision. “Scalar” means they have ranges, like weight and temperature. A 
decision ranks high on the law variable when grounded in legal sources, 
norms, and analysis that lawyers and other elites widely support. In other 
words, a decision ranks high when the legally informed audience concludes 
that it is legally correct. A decision ranks low when the legally informed 
audience concludes that it is legally incorrect. A decision takes an 
intermediate value when the audience splits, as when some lawyers support 
a decision as legally grounded and others reject it as an exercise in 
activism.128  
What makes the legally informed audience conclude that a decision is 
correct? Substance matters, of course. The decision will seem correct if 
lawyers can follow and support the court’s legal reasoning. But form matters 
too. Judges can signal that they are applying law correctly. Judges can 
“display the trappings of judicial neutrality,” justifying their decisions in 
objective terms and “reinforcing the idea that they are merely mouthpieces 
 
126. See Terence C. Halliday, Why the Legal Complex is Integral to Theories of Consequential 
Courts (arguing that the power of courts relates to the legal complex), in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, 
supra note 68, at 337; EPP, supra note 33, at 2–3 (arguing that powerful courts are the fruit of advocacy, 
growth of financial and legal resources, and strategic planning). 
127. On the general question of how courts can enhance their standing, see, for example, Patricia 
J. Woods & Lisa Hilbink, Comparative Sources of Judicial Empowerment, 62 POL. RSCH. Q. 745 (2009); 
Yonatan Lupu, International Judicial Legitimacy: Lessons from National Courts, 14 THEORETICAL INQ. 
L. 437 (2013); GAROUPA & GINSBURG, supra note 24, at 14–49.  
128. Recall that legitimacy for our purposes is a subtype of sociological legitimacy. Support for 
the court is key. To see why this matters, suppose that all lawyers agree that A is the correct answer in 
a case, but they are wrong. Hercules, a judge of superhuman skill, realizes that B is correct. If Hercules 
decides B, his decision is legally correct, yet the decision ranks low on our law variable because lawyers 
conclude (erroneously) that Hercules made a mistake. Cases like this should be rare. The legal 
correctness of a decision should correlate highly with legally informed actors’ perceptions of legal 












of the law.”129 As another signal, judges can issue unanimous opinions. 
Such opinions are often taken to evince a court’s commitment to legality.130 
Fractured opinions send the opposite signal. As Justice Story wrote in 1818, 
“the habit of delivering dissenting opinions . . . weakens the authority of the 
Court.”131 Finally, judges can follow procedures perceived to be fair and 
principled. 132  The fairer and more principled the process, the more 
objective, legalistic, and support-worthy a court seems.  
Now consider politics. A decision ranks high on this variable when it 
comports with the political or policy preferences in the relevant jurisdiction 
(state, nation, et cetera). When courts make decisions popular with different 
groups like ordinary citizens and elites, including academics and journalists, 
their legitimacy grows.133 How high or low a decision ranks on this variable 
depends in part on how unified or fractured opinion within a given group is. 
For example, when ordinary citizens unanimously consider a decision 
correct, the politics variable ranks higher. On the other hand, if citizen 
opinion is fractured, the politics score ranks lower.  
 
129. Kapiszewski et al., supra note 68, at 403 (calling this the “classic technique” for building 
legitimacy); see also Gibson & Nelson, supra note 38, at 211 (“[L]egitimacy seems to flow from the 
view that [judicial] discretion is being exercised in a principled, rather than strategic, way.”); James L. 
Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Why Do People Accept Public Policies They 
Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 POL. RSCH. Q. 187, 197 (2005) 
(“[T]o the extent that the Supreme Court can present its decisions as grounded in legality, acquiescence 
is more likely.”); Lisa Hilbink, JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP: 
LESSONS FROM CHILE (2007) (documenting the Chilean courts’ formalistic, legalistic and apolitical 
discourse during democracy and dictatorship). 
130. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. 
L. REV. 1335, 1359 (1998) (arguing that low dissent rates on D.C. panels provides “extremely strong 
prima facie evidence of consensus among judges about the correct judgment in a given case”).  
131. G. Edward White, The Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815–1835, 70 VA. L. REV. 1, 
37–38 (1984).  
132. On how procedural fairness increases the standing of courts, see generally TOM R. TYLER, 
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); Baird, supra note 46. See also Fallon, supra note 34, at 1843 
(proposing a theory of judicial legitimacy based in “good faith” in constitutional argumentation); Gibson 
& Caldeira, supra note 41, at 195 (arguing that a court’s legitimacy is not undermined by discretion as 
long as citizens believe that judges exercise discretion in a principled manner); Deborah Hellman, The 
Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1107 (1995); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, 
Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003) (arguing that legitimacy is a 
function of the fairness of judicial procedures); Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, 
Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to 
Gibson, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 621 (1991) (presenting evidence that perceptions of the fairness of 
Supreme Court procedures affect support for local and national institutions).  
133. See also Robert H. Durr, Andrew D. Martin & Christina Wolbrecht, Ideological Divergence 
and Public Support for the Supreme Court, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 768, 768 (2000) (showing that the 
public’s appraisal of the Supreme Court depends on whether its decisions diverge from the “ideological 
preferences of the citizenry”); Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court Opinions, 
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011 (2007) (arguing that the Supreme Court tries to present its decisions to 
satisfy its audience). See generally BAUM, supra note 68; BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: 
HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2009); Carrubba, supra note 70; Stephenson, supra note 70.  











The government matters too. Courts tend to suffer when they enrage the 
state, as with Russia’s First Constitutional Court. Thus, courts benefit when 
they make decisions favorable to the government, meaning popular with (or 
at least tolerable to) powerful actors like legislators and executives.134 When 
the policy implications of a decision please everyone, the decision ranks 
high on the politics variable. The decision ranks even higher if the court can 
advertise, promoting its favorable work and making it salient.135 When the 
policy implications of a decision, though favorable, are not salient, or when 
they are favorable to some but not others, the decision gets a lower politics 
score.  
The passive virtues are about avoiding divisive cases, meaning cases 
where law and politics diverge. The court cannot make a decision that scores 
well on one dimension without scoring poorly on the other, as in Naim. We 
focus on unity cases, meaning cases where law and politics align.136 The 
court can make a decision that scores well on both dimensions. Such a 
decision might have these features: unanimous, popular with the public, 
favorable to government actors, publicized effectively, and written and 
resolved legalistically.137  
 
134. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Chad Westerland & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Congress, the Supreme 
Court, and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
89 (2011) (finding that the U.S. Supreme Court, to protect its institutional authority, refrains from 
invalidating federal laws when it is ideologically distant from the House, Senate, and President); 
Matthew E.K. Hall & Joseph Daniel Ura, Judicial Majoritarianism, 77 J. POL. 818 (2015) (finding that 
the Supreme Court invalidates laws with little support from elected officials); Anna Harvey & Barry 
Friedman, Pulling Punches: Congressional Constraints on the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Rulings, 
1987–2000, 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 533 (2006) (finding that the Supreme Court is more likely to invalidate 
liberal laws when Congress is controlled by conservatives); see also Gretchen Helmke, The Logic of 
Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy, 96 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 291 (2002) (providing evidence that courts strategically defect against the 
government once it begins losing power); Kapiszewski et al., supra note 68, at 403 (arguing that judges 
can grow their “reservoir of goodwill” by “decid[ing] politically critical legal disputes in ways that favor 
new majorities rather than incumbents”).  
135. See, e.g., JUSTICE AND JOURNALISTS: THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Richard Davis & David 
Taras eds., 2017) (compiling essays on the relationship between constitutional courts and the press); 
STATON, supra note 70; cf. Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public 
Confidence in the Supreme Court, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1209 (1986) (finding that increased public 
salience of the Supreme Court is associated with an increase in public support).  
136. One can imagine a third type of decision that is unpopular and legally incorrect, or seemingly 
so. Presumably cases like this are rare.  
137. These are ingredients, not recipes. We can identify the factors that make a case attractive to 
courts seeking legitimacy, but we cannot specify—in the abstract, and for all courts in all contexts—the 
mix of factors that works best. Cf. GAROUPA & GINSBURG, supra note 24, at 16 (“The reputation of the 
judiciary . . . determines its status in any given society . . . . We do not specify a universal reputation 
function for judges, and we recognize that judges in different systems will seek reputations for different 












C. Examples: Timbs and Harper 
We have sketched the general features of a unity case. Now consider two 
examples mentioned above: Timbs138 and Harper.139  
Tyson Timbs, a recovering drug addict, sold about $400 in heroin to 
undercover officers.140 The police arrested him and seized his $42,000 Land 
Rover, which Timbs had purchased with an inheritance following his 
father’s death.141 The case symbolized a growing and reviled practice: asset 
forfeiture, in which states seize property connected, sometimes only 
tangentially, to crimes. 142  As in Timbs’s case, some forfeitures seem 
disproportionate to the offense. The question for the Supreme Court was 
whether the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “excessive fines” applies 
to the states.143 In a unanimous opinion, the Court said yes, protecting Timbs 
and limiting asset forfeiture.144  
Timbs is a unity case. The Court reached what nearly everyone agrees is 
the right legal answer. Other provisions of the Eighth Amendment already 
apply to the states, so the language on “excessive fines” should too.145 The 
correct legal answer was also the politically popular answer. Interest groups 
on the right and left aligned, submitting amicus briefs in support of Timbs’s 
position.146 For a court seeking legitimacy, Timbs is an appealing case. 
Now consider Harper. Virginia required citizens to pay a poll tax before 
voting in state elections. 147  Appellants argued that the tax violated the 
 
138. Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019). 
139. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Harper involved judicial review, but 
active virtues are not limited to such cases. See id. at 664. 
140. State v. Timbs, 84 N.E.3d 1179, 1181 (Ind. 2017) (recounting the facts). 
141. Id.   
142. See, e.g., Michael Sallah, Robert O’Harrow Jr., Steven Rich & Gabe Silverman, Stop and 
Seize, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/stop-
and-seize/ [https://perma.cc/B3S8-HWEP] (“There have been 61,998 cash seizures . . . since 9/11 
without search warrants or indictments . . . , totaling more than $2.5 billion. State and local authorities 
kept more than $1.7 billion of that while Justice, Homeland Security and other federal agencies received 
$800 million. . . . Only a sixth of the seizures were legally challenged, in part because of the costs of 
legal action against the government.”). 
143. 139 S. Ct. at 686. 
144. See id. at 687, 691.  
145. Cf. Mark Joseph Stern, Neil Gorsuch and Sonia Sotomayor Just Came Out Swinging Against 
Policing for Profit, SLATE (Nov. 28, 2018, 5:09 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/11/neil-
gorsuch-sonia-sotomayor-tyson-timbs-civil-forfeiture.html [https://perma.cc/AC3M-HY9K] ( “‘And 
here we are in 2018, still litigating incorporation of the Bill of Rights,’ [Justice Gorsuch] said. 
‘Really?’”).  
146. Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Business, Progressives Unite at Supreme Court Against 
Big Fines, BLOOMBERG LAW (Nov. 21, 2018, 8:52 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/ 
business-progressives-unite-at-supreme-court-against-big-fines [https://perma.cc/55YE-YSZK] 
(reporting that liberal groups like the ACLU and conservative groups like the Chamber of Commerce 
supported Timbs).  
147. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 664 & n.1 (1966).  











Constitution.148 By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the 24th 
Amendment banning federal poll taxes had passed,149 and all but four states 
had eliminated their state poll taxes.150 Enacted one year before, the federal 
Voting Rights Act declared that “the constitutional right of citizens to vote 
is denied . . . by the requirement of the payment of a poll tax.”151 Congress 
specifically directed the Attorney General “to institute forthwith in the name 
of the United States such actions, including actions against States . . . , for 
declaratory judgment or injunctive relief against the enforcement of any . . . 
poll tax.”152 Unlike Naim, which divided law and politics, Harper aligned 
them. The Justices could invalidate Virginia’s poll tax under Reynolds v. 
Sims153 (in other words, they could write an opinion seemingly faithful to 
precedent) and be confident that their decision would bring applause from 
Congress and most of the country.154 The Court did exactly that.155  
In our view, Harper is a unity case. However, it is not a perfect unity 
case. Instead of issuing a unanimous opinion, the Justices fractured, with 
six voting to invalidate the poll tax and three voting to uphold it.156 This 
leads to a clarification. The decision in a unity case need not have every 
feature mentioned above. It need not score maximally on both the law and 
politics dimensions. It need only score sufficiently high on both dimensions.  
The Supreme Court had mandatory jurisdiction in Harper.157 Thus, the 
Court did not and could not deliberately select the case to enhance its 
legitimacy. We do not claim that Harper represents active virtues at work. 
Instead, we claim that Harper provides a near-paragon example of a unity 
case. For a Court seeking legitimacy, a case like Harper is a welcome 
addition to the docket.  
D. Active Virtues and Information 
Unity cases are real. But are active virtues—the deliberate seeking out 
of unity cases—real? Practicing them seems difficult. Judges need good 
 
148. See id. at 664. 
149. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. 
150. Taps for the Poll Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1966, at 40 (explaining that four states had poll 
taxes at the time of Harper).  
151. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 10(a), 52 U.S.C. § 10306(a). 
152. Id. § 10(b).  
153. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).  
154. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (relying on Reynolds in refusing to 
sustain the poll tax). 
155. The Court had mandatory jurisdiction in Harper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964) (allowing an 
appeal from a district court of three judges, such as in Harper). Consequently, it could not intentionally 
select the case. Nevertheless, the case plausibly boosted its legitimacy.  
156. Compare Harper, 383 U.S. at 664, with id. at 670 (Black, J., dissenting), and id. at 680 
(Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.). 












information. They must know, or at least have a reasonable sense, that a 
dispute can be resolved in a way that will be sufficiently law-like and 
sufficiently popular. They must attend to questions like whether the panel 
of judges will unite behind one opinion or fracture, and whether the decision 
will please voters whom judges do not know.  
The challenge runs deeper yet. The response to a case may vary over 
time. A decision considered lawful but unpopular today can become lawful 
and popular tomorrow. Brown might fit this category. That monumental 
decision might have diminished the Court at the time but greatly 
strengthened it later. Likewise, the response to a case may vary by context. 
Making popular decisions might benefit a court—unless members of the 
public believe the judges are pandering to them. Finally, active virtues 
might backfire. Judges are supposed to wait passively for disputes.158 To 
exercise active virtues, they must seek disputes. The legitimacy loss from 
seeking a dispute could swamp the legitimacy gain from resolving it.  
We appreciate these challenges, and later we will return to some of them. 
For now we make two points. First, we claim that active virtues can enhance 
judicial legitimacy, not that they always do. Judges trying to exercise active 
virtues might make mistakes. They might attract cases they should not, just 
like judges exercising passive virtues might avoid cases they need not. 
However, judges do not have to get every case right for active virtues to 
work overall. Second, while active virtues may seem daunting in the 
abstract, the practice may be simpler on the ground. Sensible judges who 
know the law and politics of their place may have a good sense of which 
cases unite law and politics, just as they might have a good sense of which 
cases are divisive. Part III provides evidence of this. 
 
* * * 
 
To clarify and summarize our ideas, imagine a “legitimacy score” 
floating above every court. The score is an aggregate, an all-things-
considered measure of the institution’s standing. Courts want the score to 
grow, or at least stay fixed. Deciding divisive cases can cause the score to 
shrink. Courts exercise passive virtues when they avoid divisive cases. 
 
158. Scholars have challenged this passive role. See, e.g., Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (presenting managerial aspects of judging and why they challenge traditional 
understandings); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281 (1976) (arguing that courts need to abandon traditional principles of adjudication to do justice); 
Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 1833 (2001) (arguing that most state courts do not follow the passive model of judging); cf. 
David Landau, A Dynamic Theory of Judicial Role, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1501 (2014) (discussing democracy-
improving theories of the judicial role); Ruth Gavison, The Role of Courts in Rifted Democracies, 33 
ISR. L. REV. 216, 218 (1999) (suggesting that in “rifted democracies” courts should implement the 
“shared commitments of society”). 











Deciding unity cases can cause the score to grow. Courts employ active 
virtues when they seek unity cases.  
III. EXERCISING ACTIVE VIRTUES 
This Part moves from theory to evidence. We show that judges in many 
settings use active virtues, or at least engage in behavior consistent with 
them. After presenting the examples we make some general observations, 
including about active virtues in the U.S. Supreme Court. Before presenting 
the examples, we categorize them into a typology of case attraction 
mechanisms. The typology enriches the theory by drawing out distinct 
techniques that courts employ.  
A. Typology and Examples  
Judges can exercise active virtues in different ways. Consider first the 
distinction between filtration and elevation. Filtration involves sorting. 
Judges pick and choose among cases presented to them. The U.S. Supreme 
Court can practice active virtues through filtration by granting certiorari in 
unity cases. Filtration requires some docket control.  
Elevation is different. When elevating a case, judges do more than filter 
filings in their stack. They seize cases that otherwise might not reach their 
stack. To clarify, envision the Great Pyramid of Legal Order by Hart and 
Sacks.159 The base of the pyramid represents all interactions in society. A 
higher layer reflects the fraction of interactions that become cases. Another 
layer up represents cases that get appealed, and the apex represents cases 
that reach the court of last resort. Focus on that court of last resort, and 
assume it controls its docket. As disputes percolate to the top, the court 
accepts unity cases and rejects others. This is active virtues by filtration.160 
Now consider a complementary option. Instead of waiting for cases to climb 
upward, the court can reach down, elevating cases from lower layers that 
otherwise might not ascend. This is active virtues by elevation.  
To illustrate elevation, consider Colombia. A recent case involved an 
employee suing over a workplace injury.161  The trial court awarded the 
employee medical costs but not disability benefits.162 Neither the employee 
 
159. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 286 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) 
(describing the pyramid). 
160. Likewise, the court can exercise passive virtues by rejecting divisive cases. 
161. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], junio 12, 2017, M.P: Carlos Bernal 
Pulido, Sentencia T-380/17, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional (G.C.C.) T-6.033.140 (Colom.)., 
available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/RELATORIA/2017/T-380-17.htm [https://perma.cc 
/77LN-JEC5]. 












nor the employer appealed the trial court’s decision.163 Thus, no one asked 
the appellate court, let alone the Constitutional Court, to intervene. 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court seized the case and issued a 
landmark decision on the right to health.164 The case gave the Court an 
opportunity to rule for a sympathetic plaintiff and defend the rights of 
vulnerable citizens. Elevation means attracting cases from elsewhere in the 
legal system.  
Next we describe initiation. Initiation involves disputes outside of the 
legal system. It happens when courts reach to the base of the pyramid—
when they take disputes from outside of the law and draw them in. When a 
court in Pakistan converted a social problem involving oil stoves into a legal 
dispute, it initiated a case.165 
Figure 1 combines these distinctions into a typology of case attraction 
mechanisms:  
Method Examples 
Filtration United States, Mexico 
Elevation United States, Mexico 
Initiation Pakistan, India 
Figure 1: Typology of Case Attraction 
In the following pages we consider each box in the typology. We give 
examples consistent with active virtues from the listed countries. Two 
caveats are in order. First, our examples are not intended to be complete or 
representative. The list of countries where courts have attraction powers is 
long. 166  One could conduct a global survey, studying active virtues 
worldwide, but that is not our enterprise. We simply aim to show that active 
virtues are real and that courts practice them in innovative and surprising 
ways. Second, judges do not usually state that they have taken a case to 
 
163. Id. at ¶ 17. 
164. Id. at ¶¶ 37–50. To elaborate, Colombia has a procedure called tutela. See ALLAN R. 
BREWER-CARÍAS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA 147 (2009). 
Any person can use tutela to request protection of her rights. See id.; MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA ESPINOSA 
& DAVID LANDAU, COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12 (2017) (explaining the tutelas can, among 
other things, be used to challenge judicial decisions). Tutelas begin in trial courts, and parties can appeal 
decisions to appellate courts. See BREWER-CARÍAS, supra, at 149 (providing more details); NELCY 
LÓPEZ CUÉLLAR, ESTUDIO DE LA SELECCIÓN Y REVISIÓN DE TUTELAS EN LA CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL 
28, 31 (2005) (same). Colombia’s Constitutional Court reviews tutelas, but not in a standard way. All 
tutelas get referred to the Court for review. See BREWER-CARÍAS, supra, at 151. The Court can choose 
any for review—or ignore them all. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1991, July 4, 1991, 
art. 86; id. at art. 241(9).  
165. See infra Section III.A.3. 
166. The list includes the United States, Mexico, India, Colombia, Venezuela, Hungary, Serbia, 
Croatia, Austria, and Greece. See generally ALLAN R. BREWER-CARÍAS, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS 
POSITIVE LEGISLATORS: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY (2011). 











promote their court’s legitimacy.167 Thus, incontrovertible evidence eludes 
us. We have chosen examples consistent with active virtues, but we cannot 
say with certainty that they reflect active virtues. Here we join good 
company. Bickel gave examples consistent with passive virtues,168 but he 
could not read the Justices’ minds. 
1. Certificate of Division in the U.S. Supreme Court 
The Judiciary Act of 1925 gave the U.S. Supreme Court nearly complete 
control over its docket.169 The Court has some original jurisdiction, but most 
of its cases arrive through writs of certiorari. Every year litigants file 
thousands of petitions for certiorari, and the Court grants less than 100 of 
them.170 This structure requires the Court to filter, selecting cases from a 
large pool. The Court can exercise passive virtues by denying certiorari in 
divisive cases. Likewise, the Court can exercise active virtues by granting 
certiorari in unity cases. Earlier we described a modern case, Timbs, that 
might fit this category.171 
Many courts in many places have discretion in their dockets, and they 
can use that discretion to practice active virtues by filtration, the top box in 
our typology. The point seems so elementary that we do not belabor it.  
Consider a different and surprising aspect of the Supreme Court’s 
docket. In the Court’s earliest years, Justices had to “ride circuit.” In 
addition to their duties in Washington on the high court, they traveled the 
country and heard cases as members of circuit courts.172 Under the Judiciary 
Act of 1802, the circuit courts consisted of just two judges, the Justice and 
a local judge.173 Two-judge panels created the possibility of a tie.174 To 
resolve ties, the Act created the certificate of division.175 When the two 
judges disagreed with one another about a legal question, they “certified 
their division,” which sent the question to the Supreme Court.176  
 
167. Cf. Asher A. Qazi, Suo Motu: Choosing not to Legislate, Chief Justice Chaudhryas Strategic 
Agenda (“judges rarely spell out their intentions for social scientists”), in THE POLITICS AND 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CHAUDHRY COURT, 2005–2013 281 (Moeen H. Cheema & Ijaz Shafi Gilani 
eds., 2015). 
168. See generally BICKEL, supra note 13, at 111–98. 
169. For a discussion, see Jonathan Sternberg, Deciding Not to Decide: The Judiciary Act of 1925 
and the Discretionary Court, 33 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 1 (2008). 
170. See id. at 1. 
171. See supra Section II.C. 
172. For a pithy explanation, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL 
CHANGE, 1815–1835, 162–63 (1988). 
173. See 1 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 221 (2012) (describing the new 
procedure). 
174. See id.  













The Supreme Court was supposed to resolve just certified questions, but 
in practice it often wrote full opinions on the underlying case.177 Moreover, 
all Justices participated. Today’s Justices recuse themselves from cases that 
they worked on, including as lower court judges, prior to their appointment 
to the Supreme Court. 178  Not so in the early 1800s. The certificate of 
division “not only permitted justices to ‘carry’ cases up to the Court but 
assumed that when the cases arrived, those justices would participate in the 
Court’s resolution of the certified questions.”179 
The certificate of division invited strategic behavior. Justices could 
manufacture ties on the circuit court to push cases to the Supreme Court.180 
According to Ted White, this was an open secret. Justices simply 
“inform[ed] district judges that they would be disagreeing with them” or 
“instructed the district judges . . . about the prospect of certifying up 
questions.”181 Sometimes Justices openly admitted that the division was pro 
forma, just a pretense to obtain Supreme Court review.182 Correspondence 
among Justices suggests they were “routinely on the lookout for interesting 
cases on their circuits.”183 The Justices discussed points of law in their 
circuit cases with one another and “looked forward” to having the Supreme 
Court resolve them.184 
Why did the Justices do this? They might have had multiple motives: 
clarifying law, concentrating on important issues, and so on. We posit that 
one motive was to grow the Court’s legitimacy. This is consistent with 
White’s research.185 In his account, Chief Justice Marshall understood that 
 
177. See id. 
178. See id. at 222. 
179. Id.; see also Jonathan R. Nash & Michael G. Collins, The Certificate of Division and the 
Early Supreme Court, 9 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of L., Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 
2020-13, 2020) (finding just one example of a Justice recusing himself after hearing the case on circuit).  
180. ALFRED CONKLING, A TREATISE ON THE ORGANIZATION, JURISDICTION, AND PRACTICE OF 
THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 715 (3d rev. ed. 1856) (“[T]his convenient method of obtaining an 
authoritative decision upon questions of difficulty and importance, is sometimes resorted to by 
agreement, without the actual expression or even formation of hostile opinions between the judges of 
the Circuit Court.”).  
181. WHITE, supra note 173, at 222. 
182. See Bank of U.S. v. Planters’ Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 910 (1824) (opinion of 
Johnson, J.) (“This cause is one in which, from the great importance of the questions it gave rise to, was 
certified to this Court, on a pro forma difference of opinion, that it might undergo the fullest 
investigation, and give time for the maturest reflection.”). We discovered this quote thanks to Collins & 
Nash, supra note 179, at 9 n.57. 
183. WHITE, supra note 173, at 222.  
184. Id.  
185. And others’ research as well. See, e.g., Charles F. Hobson, Defining the Office: John 
Marshall as Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1421, 1429 (2006) (“[Marshall’s] overriding concern 
during his first years as Chief Justice was to insure the judiciary’s survival by directing a prudent retreat 
away from ‘politics’ and into the comfort zone of ‘law.’ Only in the safety of that refuge, Marshall 
recognized early on, could the judiciary . . . build up its institutional strength and elevate its status and 
authority.”). 











“for the Court to emerge as a branch of comparable stature to the other 
branches of the new American government, it would need to be an active 
participant in the resolution of important policy issues.”186 The certificate of 
division helped. Justices used it to “expand their docket” and “make the 
most of their jurisdiction.”187 “At this stage in the Court’s history, the more 
numerous and important the questions the better.”188 
Between 1804 and 1864, over 200 cases reached the Supreme Court 
through certificate of division.189 These included foundational cases that 
expanded national power—and featured strategic behavior. For example, 
“Justice Story, a regular user of the pro forma division procedure,” 190 
cooperated with lawyers to bring Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward191 to the Court.192 Many scholars consider that case central to 
American economic development.193  
We focus on a different case: United States v. Klintock.194 In the early 
1800s, piracy presented a problem. A federal statute passed in 1790 
addressed piracy, and the Supreme Court interpreted it in United States v. 
Palmer.195 The Court read the statute narrowly, concluding that it did not 
authorize the United States to punish piracy against foreign subjects on a 
ship belonging to subjects of a foreign state.196 The decision “appeared to 
cripple the federal Government’s power to punish pirates” 197  and drew 
fierce criticism: 
 
186. WHITE, supra note 173, at 220. 
187. Id. at 222. 
188. Id. White’s characterization—the Court aimed to raise its stature by seeking “numerous and 
important questions”—does not exactly match ours, but it is close. Also, the Justices may have had 
motivations that differ from but correlate with legitimacy, like prestige.  
189. Nash & Collins, supra note 179, at 31–36. 
190. White, supra note 131, at 22.  
191. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
192. See White, supra note 131, at 22–30.  
193. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1111, 1145–46 (2001) (reciting the view that Dartmouth College was foundational).  
194. United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820).  
195. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818).  
196. See id. at 628–34. Different scholars characterize the case differently. Compare G. Edward 
White, The Marshall Court and International Law: The Piracy Cases, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 727, 731 (1989) 
(summarizing the holding: “Congress, in using the phrase ‘any person’ in the statute, had not intended 
to extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts to crimes committed by foreign nationals on foreign 
ships”), with Justin L. Sieffert, United States v. Klintock: Reconsideration of United States v. Palmer as 
to General Piracy as Defined by the Law of Nations Through the Applicable Standards of Political 
Action of Acknowledgement and Recognition and the Status of Statelessness, LEGAL HIST. PUBL’NS, 
Dec. 2016, at 1, 28, http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlh_pubs/69 [https://perma.cc/NHG7-N 
HPY] (“[T]he United States does not have jurisdiction under the Act of 1790 [to] punish robbery on the 
High Seas of foreign subjects on a ship or vessel belonging exclusively to subjects of a foreign state by 
person of unknown citizenship.”).  












A year after the decision, [Secretary of State] John Quincy Adams 
wrote  in his diary that the Court had “cast away the jurisdiction 
which a law of congress had given.” The decision, Adams suggested, 
had been “founded on captious subtleties”: the Court’s “reasoning 
[was] a sample of judicial logic—disingenuous, false, and hollow.” 
Later, Adams remembered finding the decision in Palmer so 
“abhorrent” that “it gave me an early  disgust for the practice of 
law . . . .”198 
In a sign of discontent, Congress responded to Palmer with a new law: 
an Act to Protect the Commerce of the United States and Punish the Crime 
of Piracy.199  
In 1820, just two years after Palmer and one year after Congress’s new 
anti-piracy act, the Court used a certificate of division to draw another 
piracy case, Klintock. The facts are somewhat confusing. 200  For our 
purposes, the important point is that the Court backtracked,201 offering a 
“reconsideration of the opinion given . . . in Palmer’s case.”202 The Court 
concluded that the statute enacted in 1790—the same statute that it 
interpreted narrowly in Palmer—should in fact be interpreted broadly. 
Piracy, the Court wrote, by “a crew acting in defiance of all law, and 
acknowledging obedience to no government whatever, is within the true 
meaning of this act, and is punishable in the Courts of the United States.”203 
Scholars interpret Klintock as a reaction to the criticism of Palmer.204 
In our typology, certificate of division places the Supreme Court in the 
middle box. The Justices elevated cases that might not otherwise have 
reached the Supreme Court.  
2. Amparo in Mexico 
As mentioned above, active virtues are not confined to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Courts worldwide engage in this practice, or at least behavior 
consistent with it. This is a global phenomenon, as the following case 
studies from other countries demonstrate.  
 
198. Id. (second alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).  
199. See Sieffert, supra note 196, at 29.  
200. See id. at 9–18.  
201. White, supra note 196, at 732 (the Court in Klintock “backtrack[ed] from its earlier 
intimations”).  
202. United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 150 (1820). 
203. Id. at 152; see also White, supra note 196, at 732 (summarizing the holding) (“Robbery on 
the high seas, after Klintock, was general piracy. As such, it could be punished in the federal courts 
without regard to the nationality of the offender or the ship. This was because general piracy was an 
offense ‘against all nations.’”).  
204. See, e.g., Sieffert, supra note 196, at 2, 37. 











The Constitution of Mexico establishes a procedure called amparo.205 
Introduced in 1847, amparo aims to protect fundamental rights from abuses 
by authorities.206 Amparo operates in different ways, and the procedure has 
changed over time.207 We need not canvass all details, just a few. Amparo 
involves review by a federal court, often of a decision by a state court or 
administrative body.208 Mexico’s Supreme Court played a central role in 
amparo proceedings for many years.209 This created a heavy workload. The 
number of cases was large, leading one commentator to call amparos the 
“impossible task” (imposible tarea) of the court.210  
In 1986, a constitutional reform transferred jurisdiction in amparo 
proceedings from the Supreme Court to the federal district and circuit 
courts. Importantly, the reform gave the Supreme Court power to review 
amparo proceedings that merit a Supreme Court decision.211 This is called 
the Court’s “facultad de atracción,” or “attraction power.”212 This power 
lets the Supreme Court hear amparos that are “important” and 
“transcendent”—in other words, significant cases.213 
 
205. BREWER-CARÍAS, supra note 164, at 122; see also Francisca Pou Giménez, The Constitution 
of Mexico, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN LATIN AMERICA (Conrado Hübner 
Mendes & Roberto Gargarella eds., forthcoming Oct. 2020) (describing the amparo procedure). 
206. See JOSÉ MARÍA SERNA DE LA GARZA, THE CONSTITUTION OF MEXICO: A CONTEXTUAL 
ANALYSIS 114–15 (2013) (explaining that the amparo procedure in Mexico was inspired by American 
judicial review and the French “cassation” system designed to ensure the “correct” application of 
statutes).  
207. See, e.g., EDUARDO FERRER MACGREGOR & RUBÉN SÁNCHEZ GIL, EL NUEVO JUICIO DE 
AMPARO: GUÍA DE LA REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL Y LA NUEVA LEY DE AMPARO (2013); DANIEL 
BARCELÓ ROJAS, FRANCISCA POU GIMÉNEZ JOSÉ MARÍA SERNA DE LA GARZA, FRANCISCO 
TORTOLERO CERVANTES 195 (2018); Bruce Zagaris, The Amparo Process in Mexico, 6 U.S.–MEX. L.J. 
61 (1998) (describing the amparo process); BREWER-CARÍAS, supra note 164, at 122–29 (summarizing 
some of amparo’s components).  
208. For an overview, see sources cited supra note 207. 
209. See generally Héctor Fix-Fierro, El Amparo Judicial y la “Imposible Tarea” del Poder 
Judicial de la Federación. Perspectivas en el Centenario de la Constitución de Querétaro, in EL JUICIO 
DE AMPARO EN EL CENTENARIO DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN MEXICANA DE 1917: PASADO, PRESENTE Y 
FUTURO 477–82 (Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor & Alfonso Herrera García eds., 2017).  
210. See id.  
211. See SERNA DE LA GARZA, supra note 206, at 122 (“[T]he reform of that year established the 
power of attraction of the Supreme Court which basically means that at its discretion, the Court can 
attract and hear amparos . . . that in principle should be heard by the Circuit Courts, when it considers 
that a case involves an issue of special national relevance.”); Alberto Abad Suárez Ávila, Usos e 
Interpretación de la Facultad de Atracción en el Juicio de Amparo por la SCJN (describing the same 
transfer of jurisdiction), in EL JUICIO DE AMPARO EN EL CENTENARIO DE LA CONSTITUTICIÓN 
MEXICANA DE 1917, supra note 207, at 460.  
212. See SERNA DE LA GARZA, supra note 206, at 122. 
213. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [CP], Art. 107 § VIII(b) (flush 
language), Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 10-02-2014 
(Mex.) (“The Supreme Court of Justice may, by its own motion or by motion of the collegiate circuit 
court or the Attorney General in the issues that concern to the Public Prosecution Service, or by the 
Federal Executive through its Legal Government Counselor, hear constitutional adjudications in review 












Attraction does not work through a standard appellate procedure. 
Instead, a limited number of parties have standing to request that the 
Supreme Court attract a case. Those parties include the attorney general 
and—here is the interesting part—the Supreme Court Justices 
themselves.214 
When the attorney general asks the Court to attract a case, the Court 
engages in filtration, the top box in our typology. It filters cases presented 
to it from inside the legal system, taking some and rejecting others. When 
the Justices request that the Court take a case, they engage in elevation.215 
They scrutinize lower court proceedings and, regardless of whether anyone 
has appealed or has standing to appeal, seize a case for resolution by the 
Court.216  
To elevate cases, the Justices must know the business of lower courts. 
They must be able to identify desirable amparos. They have several means 
for doing so. First, they use a tracking mechanism that lets them browse 
lower court amparos.217 Second, the Justices have asked circuit judges to 
inform them of novel and potentially important constitutional cases. 218 
Finally, the Court has enlisted the public. The Justices have encouraged 
citizens, scholars, and public interest lawyers to call the Court’s attention to 
important cases.219  
 
214. Id.  
215. The court has attracted a case at the request of a Justice 191 times. See Suárez Ávila, supra 
note 211, at 471. 
216. See ALBERTO ABAD SUÁREZ ÁVILA, LA PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES 
EN LA NOVENA ÉPOCA DE LA SUPREMA CORTE 73, 80 (2014) (“Los sujetos legitimados para solitary la 
facultad de atracción son de dos tipos: de oficio, los Ministros de la SCJN y, a petición de parte, el 
Procurador General de la República y los Tribunales federales. Ni la Constitución ni la legislación 
secundaria contemplan ningún otro tipo solicitante con personalidad distanta a la de los anteriores, y la 
SCJN sostuvo el criterio de no discutir aquellas solicitudes presentadas por sujetos distintos a los 
legitimados, tales como las partes del juicio, los jueces de Distrito, Presidentes de los Tribunales 
Colgiados de Circuito o de cualquier otro sin la calidad requerida por la Constitución. Los Tribunales 
Colegiados de Circuito se posicionaron como los solicitantes más asiduos con un 52.08% del total de 
las solicitudes. En segundo lugar se encontró un sujeto no lgitimado: el quejoso con un 25.06% de las 
solicitudes, de las cuales en su inmensa mayoría fueron desechadas al momento de resolverse. En tercer 
lugar aparece la solicitud de oficio de la SCJN con un 18.10%, resultado de la suma de un 12.67% de 
los casos por los ministros de la SCJN de forma invididual y un 5.43% solicitado a través del Presidente 
del Pleno o de la Sala.”). 
217. See Mónica Castillejos-Aragón, The Transformation of the Mexican Supreme Court into an 
Arena for Political Contestation, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 68, at 138, 152–53; José 
Ramón Cossío Díaz & Luz Helena Orozco y Villa, La Activa Suprema Corte, NEXOS, (Jan. 1, 2012) htt 
ps://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=14628 [https://perma.cc/88MC-HUJ7] (“Ahora bien, ¿cómo identificar y 
atraer los asuntos ‘importantes y trascendentes?’ Desde 2007 los integrantes de la Primera Sala de la 
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación han generado condiciones institucionales para, primero, 
identificar y atraer los asuntos específicos y, segundo, generar a partir de ellos criterios y tesis 
jurisprudenciales de aplicación obligatoria en todo el país.”). 
218. Cossío Díaz & Orozco y Villa, supra note 217. 
219. Id.; Suárez Ávila, supra note 211, at 471; Castillejos-Aragón, supra note 21768, at 155. 











Mexico’s Supreme Court has used its attraction power to make landmark 
decisions in cases involving the freedom of speech, due process, domestic 
violence, health, children’s rights, privacy and data protection, and 
transgender rights.220 Here is one example.  
In 2006, three indigenous women were prosecuted for “kidnapping” six 
police officers in Queretaro, Mexico.221 The women were informal street 
vendors, and the officers had visited their market to conduct an “anti-piracy” 
operation, during which they destroyed the vendors’ property and extorted 
them for bribes.222 Normally the vendors paid the bribes, but this time the 
community confronted the corrupt officers and denounced them to their 
superiors.223 The superiors came to the market, paid the vendors for the 
damage the officers had caused, and left. 224  Five months later, three 
vendors—Jacinta Francisco Marcial, Alberta Alcántara Juan, and Teresa 
González Cornelio—were arrested for kidnapping the officers.225 
The case against the women featured many due process violations. The 
women bore the burden of proving their innocence.226 The proceedings were 
conducted in Spanish, which the women did not speak.227 No translator was 
provided. 228  The state’s main witness was not cross-examined. 229  The 
women were condemned to twenty-one years in prison. 230  During her 
imprisonment Teresa had a daughter, Jazmín, who lived the first years of 
her life behind bars.231  
The case created a domestic and international backlash. 232  Amnesty 
International called one of the women a “prisoner of conscience” and 
 
220. Castillejos-Aragón, supra note 67, at 153; Cossío Díaz & Orozco y Villa, supra note 217; 
SUÁREZ ÁVILA, supra note 216, at 102. 
221. Dossier de prensa de Doña Jacinta Francisco Marcial, CENTRO PRODH (Dec. 12, 2017), http 
s://centroprodh.org.mx/2017/12/12/dossier-de-prensa-de-dona-jacinta-francisco-marcial/ [https://perma 
.cc/3K27-6EP2]. 
222. Id.; see also Ricardo Homs, Mentir sin Consecuencias . . . Jacinta, Alberta y Teresa, EL 
UNIVERSAL (Feb. 25, 2017, 1:37 PM), http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/blogs/ricardo-homs/2017/02/25/ 
mentir-sin-consecuencias-jacinta-alberta-y-teresa [https://perma.cc/44BC-FHFC]. 
223. Dossier de prensa de Doña Jacinta Francisco Marcial, supra note 221 
224. Id. 
225. Rosalía Solís, El caso por el que la PGR se disculpó, MILENIO (Feb. 21, 2017), http://www.m 
ilenio.com/policia/disculpa_publica-pgr-indigenas-alberta-teresa-jacinta-secuestro-afi-milenio_noticias 
_0_907109325.html [https://perma.cc/EBJ3-FJUW]. 
226. Luis Arriaga Valenzuela, Jacinta y la procuración de justicia en México, EPIKEIA: REVISTA 
DE DERECHO Y POLÍTICA, Fall 2009, at 1, 4. 
227. Id.  
228. Id. at 9. 
229. Id. at 19. 
230. Jacinta, una mujer incómoda para la justicia, PROCESO (Sept. 16, 2009), https://www.proces 
o.com.mx/118743/jacinta-una-mujer-incomoda-para-la-justicia [https://perma.cc/XN2J-TYP6].  
231. Jacobo García, “No solo queremos perdón, exigimos respeto como indígenas”, EL PAÍS (Feb. 
21, 2017, 9:24 PM), https://elpais.com/internacional/2017/02/21/mexico/1487681298_217747.html [htt 
ps://perma.cc/QJL8-AABL].  












accused Mexico of systematically discriminating against indigenous 
people. 233  The World Organization Against Torture said the case is 
“symptomatic of the vulnerability of indigenous people, particularly 
indigenous women, who suffer most intensely the phenomena of 
discrimination, exclusion and marginalization” in Mexico. 234  Domestic 
human rights organizations joined the campaign. 235  Mexico’s Senate 
created a committee to investigate the case.236 
Three years after their imprisonment, Teresa and Alberta appealed their 
sentence to a circuit court.237 Meanwhile, Justice Juan Silva Meza of the 
Supreme Court asked his fellow Justices to use the facultad de atracción 
and seize the case.238 In a “historical” move, the Court did just that, taking 
the case from the circuit court before it had concluded its proceedings.239 In 
 
233. Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, Mexico: Woman Accused of Kidnapping Six Agents Named 
Amnesty Prisoner of Conscience (Aug. 13, 2009), https://www.amnesty.org.uk/press-releases/mexico-
woman-accused-kidnapping-six-agents-named-amnesty-prisoner-conscience [https://perma.cc/56QJ-H 
NF6]); Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, Mexico: Freedom for Indigenous Women Wrongly Imprisoned for 
Three Years on Fabricated Charges (Sept. 17, 2009) (https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2009/0 
9/mexico-freedom-indigenous-woman-wrongly-imprisoned-three-years-fabricat-0/ [https://perma.cc/W 
KX2-9EWW]). Amnesty International stated, “Jacinta’s story shows that Mexican criminal justice 
system is being misused to prosecute the most vulnerable. She has been targeted because of her ethnicity, 
gender and social status.” Amnesty Int’l, Mexico: Woman Accused of Kidnapping Six Agents Named 
Amnesty Prisoner of Conscience, supra. 
234. Cuestiona organismo internacional proceso de Jacinta Francisco, ZÓCALO, http://www.zoc 
alo.com.mx/new_site/articulo/cuestiona-organismo-internacional-proceso-de-jacinta-francisco [https:// 
perma.cc/G6YH-W59K] (translated by author Maurcio Guim) (“Esta organización consideró que los 
casos de las tres mujeres ‘son sintomáticos de la vulnerabilidad de los indígenas, en particular de las 
mujeres indígenas, quienes sufren con mayor intensidad los fenómenos de discriminación, exclusión y 
marginación del sistema de justicia mexicano.’”). 
235. Cronología. El caso Jacinta Francisco Marcial, EL UNIVERSAL (May 29, 2014), https://archi 
vo.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion-mexico/2014/impreso/cronologia-el-caso-jacinta-francisco-marcial-215 
930.html [https://perma.cc/67SA-XHLX]; Carlos Avilés, SCJN pide liberar a Teresa y Alberta, por 
irregularidades, EL UNIVERSAL (Apr. 27, 2010), http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/primera/34838.html 
[https://perma.cc/NZ89-PR7A].  
236. Isabel Longhi-Bracaglia, El Supremo mexicano exculpa y ordena liberar a dos indígenas 
encarceladas desde 2006, EL MUNDO (Apr. 28, 2010, 3:48 PM), http://www.elmundo.es/america/2010/ 
04/28/mexico/1272484111.html [https://perma.cc/AV52-Z5DL].  
237. See Press Release, Centro Prodh, Alberta y Teresa apelan contra la injusta sentencia de 21 
años de prisión ordenada por el juez cuarto de distrito de Querétaro (Feb. 25, 2010), https://centroprodh.o 
rg.mx/2010/02/25/alberta-y-teresa-apelan-contra-la-injusta-sentencia-de-21-anos-de-prision-ordenada-
por-del-juez-cuarto-de-distrito-en-queretaro/ [https://perma.cc/8QTW-CFXU]. The other defendant, 
Jacinta Francisco Marcial, was released in 2009. See Amnesty Int’l, Mexico: Freedom for Indigenous 
Women Wrongly Imprisoned for Three Years on Fabricated Charges, supra note 233.  
238. Supreme Court of Mexico, Recurso de Apelación 2/2010 Derivado de la Facultad de 
Atracción 3/2010 (“FIFTH. In writing of sixteen of March of two thousand and ten, the Minister Juan 
N. Silva Meza, asked his fellow Ministers who are members of the First Chamber of the Supreme Court 
of Justice of the Nation, ex officio to exercise the faculty of attraction to hear the appeal . . . .”). 
239. Jesús Aranda, Atrae la Corte casos de indígenas a acusadas de secuestrar a seis afis, LA 
JORNADA (March 18, 2010), http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2010/03/18/politica/018n1pol [https://perma 
.cc/2XHQ-2BM7]. The Court accepted the request and justified its decision on the “great interest” that 
the case had created and the opportunity to establish clear standards on women’s rights and 
discrimination. Id.  











a unanimous opinion, the Court absolved the women and ordered their 
immediate freedom.240 International and domestic organizations, including 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, celebrated the decision.241  
This case supports Justice José Ramón Cossío Díaz’s explanation of the 
facultad de atracción. It not only offers a mechanism to develop the 
principles established in the Constitution. It empowers Mexico’s Supreme 
Court to make the decisions that “society demands.”242 
When the Justices seek the cases, the Mexican Supreme Court’s amparo 
process fits in the middle box of our typology. The Court elevates cases 
from lower tribunals in the legal system. Active virtues provide a plausible 
explanation for the Court’s actions.  
3. Pakistan’s Suo Motu Jurisdiction 
In Pakistan, suo motu jurisdiction allows courts to initiate cases external 
to the legal system. The suo motu power has been defined as “taking notice 
or cognizance of a matter by a court . . . upon its own initiative.”243 This fits 
in the bottom box of our typology. Judges convert problems in society into 
cases in their courts.  
The suo motu powers appear in Article 184(3) of Pakistan’s 
Constitution.244 That article empowers the Supreme Court to direct a person 
 
240. Supreme Court of Mexico, Recurso de Apelación 2/2010 Derivado de la Facultad de 
Atracción 3/2010 (“Finally, regarding the last of the requirements set forth in Article 105 of the 
Constitution, consisting in the fact that the relative issue covers the characteristics of ‘interest and 
transcendence’, it must be equally satisfied.”).  
241. The High Commissioner of United Nations for Human Rights recognized the “importance” 
of the judgment. ONU pide investigar caso de Teresa y Alberta, EL UNIVERSAL (Apr. 29, 2010, 4:38 
PM), http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/676799.html [https://perma.cc/FJF3-NJCV]. The World 
Organization Against Torture considered the release “very important” and “a fundamental step in the 
realization of complete justice.” México: Liberadas las Sras Alberta Alcántara Juan y Teresa González 
Cornelio en Mexico, WORLD ORG. AGAINST TORTURE (Apr. 30, 2010), https://www.omct.org/es/urgent-
campaigns/urgent-interventions/mexico/2010/04/d20669/ [https://perma.cc/8SV2-BEZN] (translated 
by author Maurcio Guim). The National Commission for Human Rights said, “justice has been done.” 
Supremo mexicano ordena liberar a indígenas acusadas de secuestrar a policías, PAN. AM. (Apr. 28, 
2010, 4:05 PM), https://www. panamaamerica.com.pa/node/552211 [https://perma.cc/N2FR-PYRE]. 
242. Cossío Díaz & Orozco y Villa, supra note 217 (“La razón que subyace al ejercicio de la 
facultad de atracción no es que la Suprema Corte deba conocerlo todo, sino que el mecanismo permite 
que el órgano construya adecuadamente su agenda, limitada en tiempo y recursos. Hablar de ‘agenda’ 
no debe conducirnos a suponer que la Corte habrá de hacer política en el sentido ordinario de la 
expresión. Se trata de una cuestión más profunda: a partir de las competencias otorgadas la Suprema 
Corte puede pronunciarse sobre temas que la sociedad exige.”) 
243. WERNER MENSKI, AHMAD RAFAY ALAM & MEHREEN KASURI RAZA, PUBLIC INTEREST 
LITIGATION IN PAKISTAN 200 (2000). 
244. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 184, § 3 (“Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 199, the 
Supreme Court shall, if it considers that a question of public importance with reference to the 
enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II is involved have the 













or authority to refrain from doing anything she is not permitted to do or to 
do anything she is required to do.245 The Court can issue such a directive 
regardless of whether a person with standing brought the case.246 Initially, 
the provision was interpreted to relax standing so “any bona fide 
representative could bring a petition on behalf of an affected group or 
class.”247 Later the Court held that the provision empowered it to initiate 
cases of its own accord.248 Any Justice of the Supreme Court can propose 
the exercise of suo motu jurisdiction.249  
Scholars argue that Pakistan’s Supreme Court has used suo motu as a 
legitimizing tool.250 To understand this argument, consider this pattern in 
Pakistan. When the military overthrows a democratically elected 
government, the Supreme Court validates the new regime. This guarantees 
the Court’s institutional survival, but it costs the Court public support.251 
 
INTEREST ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION IN INDIA, PAKISTAN AND BANGLADESH 205 (2004) (“[A]ny 
person can give a Magistrate information of the existence of any state of affairs, but when the magistrate 
is acting on that information, he is acting suo motu. The person who gives the information has no right 
in the matter and is not a person who may be described as a party to the proceedings.”).  
245. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 184, § 3 (“[T]he Supreme Court shall, if it considers that a question 
of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights . . . is involved, 
have the power to make an order . . . .”). 
246. Two requirements limit the Court’s suo motu jurisdiction. First, the case must be related to a 
question of “public importance,” and second, the purpose of the action must be to protect a “fundamental 
right.” See Moeen H. Cheema, The “Chaudhry Court”: Deconstructing the “Judicialization of Politics” 
in Pakistan, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 447, 479 (2016). To satisfy the first requirement, the case “must affect 
people at large and not just identifiable groups or classes.” Id. Regarding the second requirement, 
“fundamental rights” have been held to include social and economic rights, or what we might call 
positive rights. See, e.g., Shehla Zia v. WAPDA, (1994) PLD (SC) 693 (Pak.). 
247. Cheema, supra note 246, at 478; see also MENSKI, ALAM & KASURI, supra note 243, at 74 
(“The Article does not even make the powers of the Supreme Court dependent on an ‘aggrieved party’, 
thus dispensing with the traditional rule of locus standi altogether, allowing the Supreme Court not only 
to entertain petitions at the behest of any person but to act suo motu as well.”).  
248. See, e.g., Masih v. State, (1990) PLD (SC) 513 (Pak.) (Supreme Court case initiated suo moto 
on behalf of bonded brick kiln laborers).  
249. However, all suo motu actions must be approved by the Chief Justice. See Shoaib A. Ghias, 
Miscarriage of Chief Justice: Judicial Power and the Legal Complex in Pakistan under Musharraf, 35 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 985, 991 (2010) (“As the assignment of cases to particular justices can shape the 
outcome, the chief justice plays a defining role in the jurisprudence of the Court. The chief justice can 
also approve suo motu actions taken by the Supreme Court justices.” (internal citations omitted)); see 
also Osama Siddique, The Judicialization of Politics in Pakistan: The Supreme Court after the Lawyer’s 
Movement (“The fact that suo motu powers are centrally vested with the Chief Justice, and that there are 
no established and publicly known parameters and filtering mechanisms regulating its use, make them 
completely ad hoc . . . .”), in UNSTABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM 159, 178 (Mark Tushnet & Madhav 
Khosla eds., 2015). 
250. See Maryam S. Khan, Genesis and Evolution of Public Interest Litigation in the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Judicialization, 28 TEMP. INT’L & COMPAR. L.J. 285, 
352 (2014) (“The Supreme Court’s assertion of autonomy grows out of its need for self-legitimation at 
the beginning of every cycle of democratic transition, including at opportune moments of such transition 
in military led ‘guided-democracy.’”). 
251. See, e.g., OMAR NOMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN 1947–1985 140–50 (1988) 
(recounting the Supreme Court’s support for a dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq, who eventually abrogated 
 











When the dictatorship starts to lose power, the Court actively uses suo motu 
to regain its lost public support.252 As Maryam Khan explains, heavy suo 
motu usage has occurred during interludes between decaying dictatorships 
and popularly elected governments. 253  During these periods, the Court 
buries the shame of having validated a military coup.254 
An example of this strategy occurred in 2005 when Iftikhar Chaudhry 
became the Chief Justice. As a lower court judge, Chaudhry had “validated 
the military takeover by General Musharraf, his referendum, the legal 
framework order that prevented non-Muslim minorities from participating 
in elections, and the constitutional amendment that gave the president 
extraordinary powers[.]” 255  However, after assuming the role of Chief 
Justice, Chaudhry changed course. 256  He created a “cell” to receive 
“applications relating to human rights violations either through post, fax, 
telegram, e-mail, court box, or on the basis of print and electronic media 
reports.”257 Based on the information provided by the cell, the Court decided 
to initiate suo motu cases.258 The Court decided hundreds of these cases,259 
receiving media attention and making the “Chief Justice as well as the 
 
the constitution); Tasneem Kausar, Judicialization of Politics and Governance in Pakistan: 
Constitutional and Political Challenges and the Role of the Chaudhry Court (“In short, Pakistan’s 
Supreme Court has followed the path of least resistance and least fidelity to constitutional principles . . 
. the courts have been the military’s handmaiden in extra-constitutional assaults on the democratic 
order.”), in PAKISTAN’S STABILITY PARADOX 28, 30 (Ashutosh Misra & Michael E. Clarke eds., 2013). 
252. See Khan, supra note 250, at 307–08 (arguing that the Supreme Court created public interest 
litigation to bury its undemocratic past). 
253. See id. at 344. 
254. See id. 
255. SADAF AZIZ, THE CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 62, 136 (2018). 
256. Id. at 136–37 (“In a turnaround from this early record, Chaudhry was reborn as an activist 
judge upon becoming Chief Justice. Early in his tenure a human rights cell was set up at the Supreme 
Court. A novel innovation, it receives applications related to human rights violations through post, fax, 
telegram, email, or through the use of court box available in the Supreme Court or on the basis of print 
and electronic media reports. A staff of intermediaries then prepares a fact sheet on the basis of which 
the court can initiate suo motu cases. The process enabled over 6,000 human rights cases . . . to be 
decided for affected parties without, often, the expenses involved in retaining counsel themselves.”). 
257. Id.  
258. Id. (“A staff of intermediaries then prepares fact sheets on the basis of which the court can 
initiate suo motu cases.”). 
259. FAQIR HUSSAIN, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF PAKISTAN 9–11 (2015) (“To provide an 
expeditious and inexpensive remedy, in matters related to the infringement of fundamental rights, a 
human rights cell was established in the Court . . . . The cell is mandated to expeditiously process the 
complaints received from the general public . . . . In this way relief is provided . . . without going through 
the traditional protracted litigation process. As a consequence there is always huge number of pending 
cases before the Court. As per latest data available, on 31st December 2013, a total of 20,480 cases were 
pending before the Supreme Court. Approximately 14000–16000 cases are annually filed in the Court. 












institution of the Supreme Court increasingly popular amongst a broad 
swathe of Pakistani society.”260  
In 2007, when General Musharraf suspended Justice Chaudhry, a 
massive number of people took to the streets.261 Inspired by this support, the 
Supreme Court ordered a dramatic restoration, declaring General 
Musharraf’s acts illegal and affirming that Chaudhry was the rightful Chief 
Justice.262  
Here is a more granular example of active virtues in Pakistan. Household 
oil stoves routinely exploded, injuring or killing women as they cooked for 
their families. 263  In most cases, the explosions resulted from a 
manufacturing defect.264 Inspired by press reports of this problem, Justice 
Munir Khan of the Lahore High Court initiated a suo motu action against 
manufacturers.265  He justified the action on the ground that “the whole 
episode . . . had remained unobserved, unchecked and uncontrolled by the 
authorities concerned.”266  
The Court remade the law in this area. It established comprehensive 
procedures to be followed by police and doctors in cases of stove 
explosions; ordered the government to force manufacturers to register and 
guarantee the “fitness and quality” of the stoves; required public hospitals 
to provide free aid to victims of stove explosions; and forced the 
government to pay for the funeral and burial expenses of victims killed by 
explosions because “families cooking food on oil stoves do not have cash 
 
260. Id. The cases decided by the Court were popular and, legally speaking, uncontroversial. 
“[T]he Supreme Court frequently targeted situations in which the local political elites were implicated. 
These included the recovery of kidnap victims in which politicians had been involved. Additionally, 
cases of police brutality, as well as of violence against women, were taken up.” Id; see also Khan, supra 
note 250, at 323–24 (“With Musharraf’s eye turned away . . . the time was ripe for the court to try to 
restore its legitimacy and regenerate public confidence in its capacity to deliver justice to the common 
man. . . . The Supreme Court specially mobilized its suo motu power to take cognizance of newsworthy 
human rights abuses.”); Siddique, supra note 249, at 189 (describing the Court’s use of suo motu and 
efforts to “ensure that its interventions were widely publicized and celebrated” as a strategy to grow 
judicial power); Qazi, supra note 167, at 308 (“Justice Chaudhry highlighted issues which resonated 
with the public; he also avoided issues which may have attracted widespread disapproval”); id. at 311–
12 (suggesting that Chaudry’s use of suo motu grew the Court’s legitimacy).  
261. See Tom Ginsburg, The Politics of Courts in Democratization: Four Junctures in Asia 
(“Justice Chaudhry responded by resisting the attack and framing it as directed against the judiciary as 
a whole. The attack prompted broad demonstrations from the bar, which took to the streets to protest the 
decision and was joined by broad coalition of supporters . . . . The legal complex was mobilized. The 
legal controversy ended in the courts, and featured the remarkable spectacle of the Supreme Court 
reinstating Chaudhry on the grounds that his dismissal violated the law.” (internal citation omitted)), in 
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 68, at 45, 61. 
262. See id. 
263. See MANSOOR HASSAN KHAN, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION: GROWTH OF THE CONCEPT 
AND ITS MEANING IN PAKISTAN 72 (1993). 
264. See id. 
265. See id. 
266. Id. 











ready to meet the compulsory expenses of sudden demise.”267 Finally, to 
encourage lawsuits against stove manufacturers, the Court encouraged the 
government to eliminate filing fees.268  
The Court justified its decision as follows: when authorities “do not 
discharge their obligations toward citizens or if they are not prepared to 
realize their duties towards the Nation then the High Court must come to 
the rescue of the citizens by assuming suo motu jurisdiction.”269  
Suo motu fits in the bottom box of our typology. Pakistani courts initiate 
cases.  
4. India’s Epistolary Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court of India’s epistolary jurisdiction fits in the bottom 
box of the typology. By eliminating all standing requirements and allowing 
plaintiffs to approach the Court through letters, postcards, and telegrams, 
the Court has empowered itself to initiate disputes.270  
Like most common law jurisdictions, India long followed traditional 
principles of adjudication.271 To sue, plaintiffs had to show that their rights 
had been violated and that they were directly affected by the challenged 
government action.272 The case had to be ripe for judgment and brought 
within a reasonable time.273 
These principles prevailed until the 1980s, when the Indian Supreme 
Court decided a series of important cases that practically eliminated 
standing requirements and procedural formalities.274 The Court achieved 
this by reinterpreting Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, which states: 
“The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the 
 
267. Id. at 74. 
268. Id.  
269. Id. The Court also wrote: “women in hundreds have died by stove bursts leaving behind 
thousands of orphan children, but the negligent and criminal action of the manufacturers of oil stoves 
enjoys immunity because of inaction on the part of authorities.” Id.  
270. See generally Shyam Divan, Public Interest Litigation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
INDIAN CONSTITUTION 662 (Sujit Choudhry, Madhav Khosla & Pratap Bhanu Mehta eds., 2016). 
271. S.P. Sathe, Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 29, 63 (2001) 
(describing the transformation of India’s judicial process from private law adjudication to public interest 
litigation). 
272. S.P. SATHE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN INDIA: TRANSGRESSING BORDERS AND ENFORCING 
LIMITS 197 (2003) (explaining that, under English influence, India followed traditional rules of private 
law adjudication). 
273. Id. at 199. 
274. Manoj Mate, The Rise of Judicial Governance in the Supreme Court of India, 33 B.U. INT’L 
L.J. 169, 178 (2015) (“In 1981, a seven-judge constitutional bench of the Court, in S.P. Gupta v. Union 
of India (the ‘Judges’ case’) formally incorporated the liberalization of standing for PIL claims into 
law.”); see also Shylashri Shankar, The Embedded Negotiators: India’s Higher Judiciary and 
Socioeconomic Rights (“In S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, the court relaxed the rules of locus standi and 
opened the doors of the Court to public spirited persons . . . .”), in CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE GLOBAL 












enforcement of the rights . . . is guaranteed.” 275  The new interpretation 
made access to the Court simple and almost cost-free.276 In the Court’s 
words:  
[W]here a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a 
determinate class of persons . . . and such person or determinate class of 
persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or disability or socially or 
economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach the Court for 
relief, any member of the public can maintain an application for appropriate 
direction.277 
The last phrase is the key. Any person can approach the Court and 
request its protection for the poor or other disadvantaged groups.278 These 
reforms opened the Court’s doors to millions of plaintiffs.  
The standing revolution allowed people to petition the Court on others’ 
behalves. However, the Justices thought it unfair for a person acting pro 
bono publico to incur the expenses of paying a lawyer to prepare a formal 
petition.279 Thus, the Justices simplified matters further. A public-spirited 
plaintiff could simply write a letter to the Court, which could convert it into 
a public interest case.280 When the Court converts a letter into a case, it 
exercises its epistolary jurisdiction.  
 
275. India Const. art. 32, cl. 1. 
276. In addition to relaxing standing, the Court restricted waivers of rights that could impede 
litigation: “A large majority of our people are economically poor, educationally backward and politically 
not yet conscious of their rights. Individually or even collectively, they cannot be pitted against the State 
organizations and institutions, nor can they meet them on equal terms.” Nath v. Comm’r of Income Tax, 
(1959) 1 SCR Supl. 528 (1958) (India). The Court transformed statutes of limitation into loose standards: 
“The principle of laches is based on a sound policy of protecting public interests. Where, however, not 
entertaining a petition caused greater harm to public interest than the harm caused by entertaining it, it 
must be entertained.” Jalmi v. The Speaker, (1993) 2 SCR 820 (India). Finally, it eliminated strict 
pleading doctrines. “The Court [will] not stand on the formality of the petitioner’s having asked for a 
specific remedy. If the petitioner establishes the case of violation of his right, the court would issue an 
appropriate remedy irrespective of what remedy has been prayed for.” Basappa v. Nagappa, (1955) 1 
SCR 250 (1954) (India). 
277. Gupta v. President of India, (1982) 2 SCR 365 (1981) (India). 
278. As Justice Bhagwati said in People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, (1983) 
1 SCR 456, 466 (1982):  
[P]ublic interest litigation . . . is a totally different kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional 
litigation . . . . Public interest litigation is brought before the court not for the purpose of 
enforcing the right of one individual against another as happens in the case of ordinary 
litigation, but it is intended to promote and vindicate public interest which demands that 
violations of constitutional or legal rights of large numbers of people who are poor, ignorant or 
in a socially or economically disadvantaged position should not go unnoticed and unredressed. 
That would be destructive of the Rule of Law . . . . 
279. SATHE, supra note 272, at 205.  
280. Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the 
Impossible?, 37 AM J. COMPAR. L. 495, 499–500 (1989) (“There are reports of actions begun by 
postcard, and even one judge converting a letter to the editor in a newspaper into a PIL [public interest 
litigation] writ. Judges have been known to invite and encourage public interest actions.”); Marc 
Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, “Bread for the Poor”: Access to Justice and the Rights of the Needy 
 











The first letters were addressed to individual judges who could convert 
them into formal petitions.281  In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, a 
prison inmate wrote a letter to a Justice calling his attention to the torture of 
a fellow inmate by authorities.282 The Court converted the letter into a public 
interest case that contributed to the judicial discourse on prisoners’ rights.283 
Another case, Hussainara Khatoon v Bihar, started with a letter denouncing 
long pretrial detentions.284 The Court gathered information about a large 
number of people who suffered from such detentions and ruled that the legal 
process must proceed faster.285  
Between January 1987 and March 1988, the Court received around 
23,000 letters.286 The Court created a special office to review and filter 
them.287 This office culls through the letters, passing some to the Chief 
Justice for review.288 Sometimes the Court asks public interest lawyers to 
act as amicus curiae and convert a letter into a regular petition.289  
For our purposes, the main point should be clear. The Court’s epistolary 
jurisdiction allows it to initiate cases. An enormous number of disputes, 
many of which are not pending (and unless the Justices select them never 
will pend) in any court, are submitted, and the Justices convert some into 
cases. Through this process the Court has set landmark precedents on prison 
 
in India, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 789, 795 (2004) (“These included relaxation of requirements of standing, 
appointment of investigative commissions, appointment of lawyers as representatives of client groups, 
and a so-called ‘epistolary jurisdiction’ in which judges took the initiative to respond proactively to 
grievances brought to their attention to third parties, letters, or newspaper accounts.”); Upendra Baxi, 
Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India, in THE ROLE OF THE 
JUDICIARY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 39 (Neelan Tiruchelvam & Radhika Coomaraswamy eds., 1987) 
(describing litigation that has “arisen out of letters written by individuals to Justice P.N. Bhagwati . . . . 
The letters usually rely on newspaper and periodical investigative reportage. More often than not, the 
Justice brings them on the board of the Court, converting this letters into writ petition. Justice Bhagwati 
has gone so far as to invite members of the public and especially public spirited citizens to bring to his 
notice violations of basic human rights, as embodied in the Constitution, for suitable judicial action.”).  
281. P.N. Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 561, 572 (1985) (“I may point out that this innovative use of judicial power began in a rather informal 
way. One or two justices of the Supreme Court started entertaining letters written by or on behalf of 
disadvantaged people. A few of these letters were treated as petitions and . . . relief was granted to a 
large number of persons belonging to the exploited sectors of the economy.”). 
282. Batra v. Delhi Admin., (1978) 2 SCR 557 (India); see Mate, supra note 274, at 178 n.28; 
SATHE, supra note 272, at 203. 
283. Mate, supra note 274, at 178.  
284. Id. at 180–81. 
285. Id. at 181; see also MANJULA BATRA & UPENDRA BAXI, PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY OF THE RIGHTS OF ACCUSED IN INDIAN AND SOVIET 
LEGAL SYSTEMS 91 (1989). 
286. See Cassels, supra note 280, at 508. 
287. Menaka Guruswamy & Bipin Aspatwar, Access to Justice in India: The Jurisprudence (and 
Self-Perception) of the Supreme Court, in CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH, supra note 274, 
at 329, 352. 
288. Cassels, supra note 280, at 508 (“The PIL cell cull through the letters, winnowing out 
frivolous and inappropriate matters and prepare files for the Chief Justice.”). 












conditions, due process, the right to counsel, pollution, industrial hazards, 
and the right to livelihood and human dignity.290  
The Court did not stop with accepting letters and converting them into 
formal petitions. Some Justices have requested letters.291 These Justices did 
not just open the Court’s doors; they invited specific cases to come in.292  
Consider this example. In 1976, India enacted the Bonded Labor Act, 
abolishing bonded labor.293 Enforcement was imperfect. In 1981, over two 
million laborers remained in bondage.294 Vidhayak Sansad, an advocacy 
group, met with Justice P.N. Bhagwati of the Indian Supreme Court and told 
him about the struggle to enforce the Act.295 Justice Bhagwati encouraged 
the advocates to send letters to the Supreme Court, which they did, one 
asking for the identification of bonded laborers and the other requesting 
their release. 296  Soon the Court received more letters from across the 
country.297 The Court converted the letters into formal petitions, and they 
resulted in one of the Court’s most celebrated cases.298 Reflecting on these 
changes, Justice Bhagwati wrote: 
 
290. See Cassels, supra note 280, at 497. 
291. ANUJ BHUWANIA, COURTING THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN POST-
EMERGENCY INDIA 35 (2017) (“A Judge of the Supreme Court asked a lawyer to ask me to ask the 
reporter to go to these areas, get affidavits from some of the victims . . . . The affidavits were got, 
compiled, sent and he entertained a writ. Eight months later some one came to me saying that the same 
judge had sent him . . . . to ask me to ask the correspondent to file such and such information in a letter 
through so and so . . . . A third time a civil rights activist asked that the same thing be done. He said that 
the same judge had asked him.”). 
292. See Carl Baar, Social Action Litigation in India: The Operation and Limitations of the 
World’s Most Active Judiciary, 19 POL’Y STUD. J. 140, 142 (1990) (“The earliest epistles were addressed 
to individual members of the Supreme Court, and reports abound of individual judges soliciting 
petitions . . . .”); see also S.K. AGRAWALA, PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA: A CRITIQUE 16–17 
(1985) (“Some judges have been strong protagonists of PIL on the Bench and outside it. In fact they 
have also been mentioned as soliciting such petitions. The letters were, therefore, directly addressed to 
them . . . . A well-known journalist . . . remarked, ‘the point that the opponents of the case were making 
was that the litigants were choosing a judge. As it turns out, some judges were choosing their litigants.’”). 
293. See GYAN PRAKASH, BONDED HISTORIES: GENEALOGIES OF SERVITUDE IN COLONIAL INDIA 
xi (2003). 
294. Monika Sangeeta Ahuja, Public Interest Litigation in India: A Socio-Legal Study 180 (Aug. 
1995) (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, London School of Economics & Political Science) (on file with 
the London School of Economics), available at http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1417/1/U084680.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/JTS2-CHJD] . 
295. Id. at 182 (“Unable to mobilise adequately the administration and labourers . . . visited 
Justice Bhagwati, then a sitting judge of the Supreme Court, in May 1983.”). 
296. Id. at 182–83 (“After meeting with Justice Bhagwati again, two letters were sent to the Court 
on his advice - one asking for the identification of bonded labourers and the other for their release.”). 
297. Id. at 184. 
298. Morcha vs. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCR 67 (1983) (India). The Supreme Court’s decisions 
on bonded labor are credited with helping to implement the will of Parliament in the Bonded Labor Act 
of 1976. See Ahuja, supra note 294, at 187 (“It is certainly true that without the courts, the 1976 Act 
would not have been implemented at all, nor would its provisions have become known.”). The Court’s 
judgments added “to the growing force of national opinion against bonded workers.” Id. at 189. After 
the Court’s intervention many bonded laborers were released. See id. at 186. 











[P]rocedures is just a handmaiden of justice and the cause of 
justice can never be allowed to be thwarted by any procedural 
technicalities. . . . Today, a vast revolution is taking place in the 
judicial process; the theatre of the law is fast changing and the 
problems of the poor are coming to the forefront. The Court has to 
innovate new methods and devise new strategies for the purpose of 
providing access to justice to large masses of people who are denied 
their basic human rights and to whom freedom and liberty have no 
meaning.299 
What explains the Court’s development and use of epistolary 
jurisdiction? According to scholars, the answer is a combination of justices’ 
policy preferences and a “desire to rehabilitate and bolster the institutional 
legitimacy” of the Court.300  
B. Synthesis: Attraction and Strategy 
From 19th century America to India today, courts worldwide engage in 
striking, strategic behavior. Some of this behavior appears to reflect active 
virtues. The examples supported that claim with details. Here we offer 
generalizations.  
Perfection need not be the enemy of the good. The perfect case for 
exercising active virtues fully aligns law and politics. It presents an 
opportunity to make a unanimous, salient, popular, and legalistic decision. 
In reality, perfection is elusive. A case might present some but not all of 
these opportunities, as the examples demonstrate. In Mexico, freeing the 
indigenous women supported due process rights and generated support for 
the court among politicians, interest groups, and the public. But it must have 
embarrassed the police. Improving oil stoves must have been popular 
among consumers, but not stove manufacturers. Our theory does not require 
perfection. If a court attracts a reasonably unifying case with some 
expectation that its legitimacy score will grow, it has exercised active 
virtues.  
 
299. BHUWANIA, supra note 291, at 30 (emphasis omitted). 
300. Manoj Mate, Public Interest Litigation and the Transformation of the Supreme Court of 
India, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 68, at 262, 264; see also BHUWANIA, supra note 291, at 
25 (“The axiomatic explanation for the rise of PIL has been that it was an attempt by the post-Emergency 
Supreme Court to restore its image in the public eye . . . .”); Upendra Baxi, Taking Suffering Seriously: 
Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India, 1985 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 107, 113 
(“Judicial populism” in India was partly “an attempt to refurbish the image of the Court tarnished by a 
few emergency decisions and also an attempt to seek new, historical bases of legitimation of judicial 
power.”); Divan, supra note 270, at 678 (“Indian courts have set apart judicial resources to foster PIL to 
a point where this jurisdiction defines public perception of the higher judiciary. . . . Their decisions 












Imperfection requires courts to balance. In contemplating a case, judges 
must decide whether the legitimacy gains from one corner will more than 
offset the losses from another. Sometimes courts will make mistakes. This 
is true with active virtues and its twin, passive virtues. Consider Bickel’s 
tools for passive virtues: justiciability doctrines like standing and ripeness. 
The Supreme Court uses these tools after it grants certiorari, and that 
suggests a mistake. If the Court had foreseen the difficulties in the case, it 
would have denied certiorari.301  
Mistakes in active and passive virtues might sometimes connect. Active 
virtues cause courts to take cases that appear unifying. Passive virtues offer 
a lifeline for the subset of those cases that turn out to be divisive. If this is 
right, then the passive virtues we have observed are relics of the active 
virtues we have missed.  
Whether the virtues are active or passive, judges should make fewer 
mistakes as their information improves. Think again of India. Private actors, 
divorced from pending litigation, can scratch a plea on a postcard and mail 
it to the Supreme Court. A similar system operates in Pakistan and to a lesser 
extent Mexico. These mechanisms do more than empower courts to initiate 
cases. They feed information to courts so they know which cases to initiate. 
Thousands of notes on exploding stoves or bonded labor tell judges that 
thousands of people suffer from a common problem and seek redress.302 For 
courts seeking politically favorable cases, this is helpful input.  
As discussed, courts can exercise active virtues through filtration, 
elevation, and initiation. The mechanism courts choose presumably relates 
to barriers to litigation. The easier it is to sue—loose standing and other 
justiciability rules, low filing fees, active legal cultures—the more courts 
can rely on filtration. Many cases arrive at their doorsteps, and they can pick 
the unifying ones. Conversely, the harder it is to sue, the more judges must 
rely on the other tools.  
Another factor must affect the choice between filtration, elevation, and 
initiation: settlement. If parties settle, then courts cannot resolve their 
dispute.303 Broad standing rules open the door to court, but they do not help 
if litigants never enter. Failure to appeal presents a similar problem for 
 
301. This assumes denying certiorari is an option. When jurisdiction is mandatory, the Court 
cannot exercise this option.  
302. Cf. Tom S. Clark & Jeffrey K. Staton, An Informational Model of Constitutional Jurisdiction, 
77 J. POL. 589 (2015) (arguing that resolving many low-stakes cases provides courts with information 
necessary for formulating appropriate rules).  
303. See Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (arguing 
that the settlement decision fails to account for the benefits to third parties of precedents); William M. 
Landes & Richard A Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979) (suggesting 
that precedents can be a public good); Steven Shavell, The Level of Litigation: Private Versus Social 
Optimality of Suit and of Settlement, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 99, 111 (1999) (recognizing that 
precedent has social value). 











appellate courts. If litigation is structured in a way that unity cases do not 
move upward, then appellate judges lack the main ingredient of our 
recipe.304 To exercise active virtues, courts in these circumstances must 
preserve disputes. This may help explain why Colombia’s Constitutional 
Court can take a case even if no party has appealed. More generally, it may 
explain why some courts combine filtration, elevation, and initiation.  
A final factor must affect the choice between filtration, elevation, and 
initiation: legal culture. Judges in India and Pakistan attract cases in ways 
anathema to American legal norms. Perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court could, 
without loss of legitimacy, openly elevate cases in the 1800s, but it is nearly 
impossible to imagine the Court doing that now. In today’s United States, 
the norm of judicial modesty (or professed modesty) favors avoidance over 
attraction and, to the extent attraction occurs, filtration over elevation305 or 
initiation.306 This observation enriches our analysis. Earlier we wrote that 
the ideal unity case is unanimous, popular with the public, favorable to 
government actors, publicized effectively, and written and resolved 
legalistically. That last criterion should be understood to capture culture. A 
court will score poorly on that criterion if it violates the local legal culture.307  
Our examples involve courts that one might characterize as developing, 
not established. Even our discussion of the U.S. Supreme Court fits this 
picture. Surely, the power of the Court was not unshakeable in Justice 
Story’s era. This makes sense. Courts use active virtues to build legitimacy, 
which developing courts in particular need. However, we do not think active 
virtues are confined to developing courts. Justices on the U.S. Supreme 
Court still worry about legitimacy today. Justice O’Connor expressed this 
worry in Casey308; Justices Breyer and Stevens expressed it in Bush v. 
 
304. Cf. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1984) (arguing that the incentives of litigants filter easy cases out of the appellate process); 
Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717 (1988) (suggesting that 
cases that reach courts are a skewed sample of disputes). 
305. Although rarely used, the U.S. Supreme Court has the power to elevate by using a procedure 
called certiorari before judgment. See generally James Lindgren & William P. Marshall, The Supreme 
Court’s Extraordinary Power to Grant Certiorari Before Judgment in the Court of Appeals, 1986 SUP. 
CT. REV. 259, 262–63.  
306. Unlike lawyers, non-lawyers probably do not know or care about the American tradition of 
judicial modesty. Cf. David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash? Evidence 
from a National Experiment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 758 (2012) (presenting evidence that people’s 
perceptions of the Supreme Court depend on the fit between their policy preferences and the Court’s 
decisions).  
307. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departamentalism, and Judicial 
Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1042 (2004) (explaining that the legitimacy of judicial review 
depends on the constitutional culture of non-judicial actors). For an overview of cultures of legality, see 
CULTURES OF LEGALITY: JUDICIALIZATION AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA (Javier 
Couso, Alexandra Huneeus & Rachel Sieder eds., 2010). 












Gore 309 ; and by many accounts Chief Justice Roberts expressed it by 
upholding the Affordable Care Act in National Federation of Independent 
Business v. Sebelius.310  After the controversy over Justice Kavanaugh’s 
nomination, some observers predict that the Supreme Court will “lower the 
temperature” by focusing on low-profile cases instead of “fiery social 
issues.”311  Even powerful courts seem to worry about maintaining their 
stature. Thus, even powerful courts might practice active virtues.  
Today’s Supreme Court seems especially well-positioned to exercise 
active virtues. Not only does the Court get thousands of appeals from which 
to select, it has a small docket. The Court decides only about eighty cases 
per year, half as many as it decided in the 1980s.312 Perhaps this is part of 
the problem; the Court focuses on a few, divisive cases. The Justices have 
the capacity to decide many more cases, and perhaps they should. They 
could grow the Court’s docket with unity cases.  
One final observation is in order. Case filtration, elevation, and initiation 
might reflect a conscious institutional decision. Designers might expressly 
permit courts to engender cases. In this respect, there is an interesting 
difference between the passive and active virtues. To avoid a case, courts 
usually do not need an explicit power. Instead, they can just invoke general 
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procedural rules, or they can just engage in strategic delay.313 The same 
might not be true for case attraction. To filter or elevate cases, courts might 
need some form of docket control, and to initiate cases they might need 
some ex-officio powers. Our examples gestured at some of these underlying 
design decisions, but we will delay fuller exploration of them for later work. 
IV. JUDICIAL POWER AND VALUES  
So far, we have emphasized descriptive claims. We have argued that 
courts exercise active virtues in fact and that the practice is a means to an 
end—it can promote legitimacy. This Part situates those claims in a broader 
framework. We propose a portfolio theory of judicial power. According to 
our theory, courts earn and spend legitimacy by deciding unifying and 
divisive cases. They do not maximize their power; they optimize their 
effectiveness given pragmatic constraints. The portfolio theory is both a 
tentative description and an ideal. It might help explain courts’ actions, and 
it can justify those actions. After developing the theory, we address 
concerns over impartiality and activism.  
A. The Portfolio Theory of Judicial Power 
We have argued that courts exercise active virtues to grow their 
legitimacy. We feel confident about that claim and have evidence to support 
it. Here we make a broader but more tentative claim. Courts do not exercise 
active virtues to grow their legitimacy unendingly. Courts grow their 
legitimacy so they can spend it. Remember the imaginary legitimacy score 
that floats above every court. Under our account, judges do not attract some 
cases and avoid others to continually increase that score. Instead, they work 
to keep that score above the threshold required for effectiveness. As they 
decide unity cases, the score grows. As they decide divisive cases, the score 
shrinks. Courts balance cases like investors balance safe and risky 
investments. This is the portfolio theory of judicial power.  
The portfolio theory fuses active and passive virtues in a single strategy. 
Courts do not attract or avoid in isolation. They do both, sequentially or 
even simultaneously, as part of a unified effort. Whether a court decides a 
divisive case today depends on whether it decided a unity case yesterday, 
and vice versa. Consider some plausible examples. The U.S. Supreme Court 
decided Harper, the unity case that invalidated Virginia’s poll tax, in 
1966.314 That increased the Court’s legitimacy score. One year later the 
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Court spent some of that legitimacy on Loving v. Virginia, 315  which 
invalidated prohibitions on interracial marriage. Harper made Loving 
possible. Similarly, the Court avoided cases on segregation in the years 
following Brown. It had spent its capital on a divisive case—the legitimacy 
score was low—and it required replenishment. The Court needed unity 
cases before lining up another divisive case.  
Now consider a modern example. We discussed Timbs, the case on asset 
forfeiture that plausibly increased the Court’s legitimacy. The Court granted 
certiorari in that case in June 2018316—the same month that it decided 
controversial cases on discrimination against same-sex couples, President 
Trump’s travel ban, and public sector unions.317 As discussed, we are not 
certain the modern Court seeks out unity cases. But if it does, Timbs was a 
welcome addition to the docket during a tense time.  
The portfolio theory is a generalization. Courts need not behave this way 
at all times for the account to have merit; they need to behave this way 
sufficiently often. Do they? We cannot say with absolute confidence. 
Nevertheless, we think the theory has value. First, it offers a mnemonic. The 
label “portfolio theory” provides an intuition about active virtues, their 
conceptual link to passive virtues, and why courts might attract and avoid 
cases. Second, we think the portfolio theory resonates with intuitions. Many 
people have a sense that courts build legitimacy with some cases and burn 
it with others.318 Our theory just pushes the intuition. We argue that courts 
are conscious of this dynamic and use active virtues to manage it. Third, 
portfolio theory illuminates the key normative question that we have finally 
reached: should courts exercise active virtues?  
B. The Case for Active Virtues 
Some readers might argue (perhaps reflexively) that courts should not 
exercise active virtues. Judges might exercise them in fact—in Mexico, 
Pakistan, and elsewhere—but they are wrong to do so. Active virtues are 
simply inconsistent with the judicial function, the argument might go, and 
so courts should not practice them. We respectfully disagree. The passive, 
conservative sense of the judiciary that motivates this position dominates in 
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places like the United States, but it is not universal. Active virtues are a 
widespread phenomenon.  
We disagree for a second and more fundamental reason. If one places 
any weight on judicial effectiveness—on the power of courts not only to 
apply law but to secure compliance with their decisions—then courts need 
legitimacy (which, remember, for our purposes is a sociological concept tied 
to support). We think nearly everyone places weight on effectiveness. Few 
people would celebrate a court that eschews all strategy to make correct but 
pointless decisions. Few would stand by a court that resolves no disputes, 
restrains no government, and guides no behavior. It follows that nearly 
everyone sees the value of legitimacy, and so nearly everyone ought to take 
active virtues seriously. Their practice, we believe, can promote legitimacy.  
To conclude that active virtues can promote legitimacy, however, does 
not end the inquiry. Courts can follow a wide variety of strategies to 
cultivate their legitimacy. Instead of the judges themselves, other actors or 
institutions could bring legitimacy-enhancing cases to court.319 To justify 
active virtues requires rejecting those alternatives as insufficient.  
We do not reject those alternatives across the board. The practice of 
active virtues cannot be optimal everywhere. If alternative institutions and 
strategies can generate enough legitimacy for courts to be effective, then 
active virtues might not be necessary.320 Likewise, if courts have already 
mustered enough legitimacy to function as a co-equal branch of 
government, continuing to attract cases might be unjustified and even 
detrimental. Active virtues are justifiable when these alternative institutions 
and strategies are insufficient. 
Even when justifiable, the practice of active virtues needs boundaries. 
No one supports a program of legitimation that primes courts for activism 
or unbalances the branches of government. Thus, support for active virtues 
is conditional. Under what conditions are active virtues laudable? We 
cannot provide a comprehensive answer. For now, we sketch two conditions 
necessary to justify active virtues.  
The first condition we call legalistic ends. If judges seek power to 
aggrandize themselves, to supplant elected officials, or to impose their 
policy visions on citizens, then of course they should be restrained. For 
judges like these, active virtues should be forbidden. But suppose judges are 
not so avaricious. They might occasionally take liberties on jurisdiction, as 
when they avoid or attract cases for prudential reasons not explicitly 
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countenanced by law. But mostly they abide by the rules, jurisdictional and 
substantive. They usually try to resolve cases objectively, interpret law 
correctly, and exercise discretion reasonably. This account is hopeful but 
not naive. We do not envision perfect judges but realistic, well-intentioned 
judges. They try to do right in the main. When judges behave this way, the 
legalistic ends condition is met. 
The second condition we call minimalist means. If judges seek to 
maximize their legitimacy, then we object. Judges do not need maximum 
legitimacy. Like independence, legitimacy beyond a certain threshold can 
lead to trouble.321 But suppose judges simply seek effectiveness. They need 
a threshold level of legitimacy to pursue legalistic ends, and they use active 
virtues to generate and sustain it. Judges under this account follow the 
portfolio theory, which we now present as a normative ideal instead of a 
description of actual behavior. When judges satisfy this ideal—when they 
balance unity and divisive cases, but only as needed to pursue legalistic 
ends—the minimalist means condition is satisfied.  
When courts use minimalist means to pursue legalistic ends, there is at 
least a prima facie case for active virtues.  
These conditions have an analogue in avoidance. Bickel and other 
proponents of avoidance do not support its use on all occasions. Clearly, 
they would object to a judge avoiding a case out of laziness. Presumably 
they support avoidance when it promotes legitimacy that judges use to do 
their jobs properly.  
Notwithstanding this analogue, the normative analysis of passive and 
active virtues differs in an important way. When courts avoid cases, they 
leave something undecided. Litigants burn time and resources on motions, 
briefs, oral arguments, and fees, only to have the court close the door. This 
hurts litigants and can stymie the development of law. Active virtues are not 
vulnerable to this criticism. With active virtues, cases get decided. 
C. Objections: Activism and Impartiality 
Active virtues will raise concerns about activism. To support active 
virtues, one might argue, is to support a robust, aggressive judiciary. Instead 
of waiting passively and ruling cautiously, we envision judges behaving 
actively, attracting the cases they want rather than accepting the cases they 
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have.322 Instead of making decisions faithful to law, we envision judges 
trespassing on the terrain of other branches and making decisions faithful to 
their institutional desires.  
We can deflect this line of criticism with two reminders. First, our 
analysis is confined to active virtues, meaning case attraction for the 
purpose of enhancing judicial legitimacy. Judges might like to attract cases 
for all kinds of reasons. Some reasons, like clarifying law, might seem 
admirable, but many others, like overseeing a friend’s case, do not. Case 
attraction in general raises many questions that we do not explore. Second, 
the normative case for active virtues hinges on satisfaction of the legalistic 
ends and minimalist means conditions. Those conditions preclude the kind 
of activism that many people fear.  
A critic might respond as follows. Conceding, at least for the sake of 
argument, that judges can and should use attraction to build legitimacy does 
not mean we should endorse the practice. Regardless of any conditions we 
might like to attach, judges will use attraction for activist ends.  
This is an argument about unintended consequences. The claim is not 
that active virtues are problematic per se but that the mechanisms required 
for active virtues can and will be used nefariously. Of course, this could be 
correct, but we have no way of knowing. Nor does anyone else—and that 
supplies our first defense. Permitting active virtues could do more harm than 
good, but the scales could tilt the other way. The question is empirical, and 
so far the only tool for sorting this out is intuition. We would not dismiss 
active virtues, which we believe to be common and potentially beneficial, 
because of conflicting intuitions.  
Consider a related but distinct concern: impartiality. By most accounts, 
impartiality is central to the judicial function and the rule of law. Active 
virtues might threaten impartiality.  
Scholars have long considered case initiation incompatible with 
impartiality.323 Lon Fuller, for example, asked if courts should initiate cases, 
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and his general answer was no. 324  He worried that initiation would 
undermine impartiality or its appearance.325 In his view, judges should have 
an “uncommitted mind,” especially in cases involving private agreements 
between parties. 326  The initiation of cases usually implies a committed 
mind—a theory of what occurred and its proper resolution.327 Fuller wrote, 
“it is clear that the integrity of adjudication is impaired if the arbiter not only 
initiates the proceedings but also, in advance of the public hearing, forms 
theories of what happened and conducts his own factual inquiries.”328 
For similar reasons, Martin Shapiro considers initiation detrimental. His 
argument begins with the genesis of adjudication:  
[W]henever two persons come into a conflict that they cannot 
themselves solve, one solution appealing to common sense is to call 
upon a third for assistance . . . . So universal across both time and 
space is this simple social invention of triads that we can discover 
almost no society that fails to employ it. And from its overwhelming 
appeal to common sense stems the basic political legitimacy of courts 
everywhere.329 
The key phrase is “call upon a third.” In Shapiro’s view, courts function 
best when parties voluntarily approach a neutral “third” to resolve their 
dispute. If parties bring the case to the judge, and if the judge is neutral, then 
the parties can hardly complain when the judge rules for one and against the 
other.330  
When courts initiate cases, Shapiro’s triad breaks down. Judges do not 
initiate cases solely to resolve conflicts between parties. They initiate cases 
to achieve some broader social goal. “When we move from courts as conflict 
resolvers to courts as social controllers, their social logic and their 
independence is . . . undercut. For in this realm, while proceeding in the 
guise of triadic conflict resolver, courts clearly operate to impose outside 
interests on the parties.”331  
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Fuller and Shapiro might be right about case initiation in general. 
However, initiation to practice active virtues might escape their concern. 
Legitimacy and impartiality must correlate. A court will enjoy greater 
legitimacy when people perceive it as impartial, and vice versa. Thus, the 
kinds of cases that courts seeking legitimacy want to attract should tend to 
be cases that do not threaten their impartiality.  
To elaborate, Fuller and Shapiro worried most about courts hijacking 
private disputes. The danger peaks when courts have a “committed mind” 
and impose “outside interests” on private parties. But consider the examples 
of initiation from Part III. Mexico’s Supreme Court attracts “transcendent” 
cases. 332  Pakistan’s court initiates cases of “public importance” and to 
protect “fundamental rights.”333 The Supreme Court of India’s epistolary 
jurisdiction applies to “public interest cases” concerning “poor and 
disadvantaged groups.”334 None of this sounds like courts hijacking private 
disputes. It sounds like jurisdiction to resolve cases on public controversies. 
The litigants in these cases may suffer from collective action problems, 
meaning that but for initiation their cases would not get heard. Fuller 
recognized that concerns for impartiality fade where “the facts themselves 
speak eloquently for the need of some kind of inquiry” and where “initiation 
of the proceeding implies nothing more than a recognition of this need.”335  
Notwithstanding these arguments, suppose Fuller and Shapiro have it 
right. Initiation to practice active virtues, at least some of the time, 
undermines judicial impartiality. In that event we face a tradeoff. Courts can 
grow their legitimacy at the expense of impartiality. Which of these 
fundamental values should courts prioritize? The answer cannot always be 
impartiality. In some circumstances, courts must pursue legitimacy first. 
What good is impartiality when judicial decisions have no force? Who will 
use an ineffective court?  
D. Coda: The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty 
Bickel is famous not for his work on legitimacy per se but on the counter-
majoritarian difficulty. The “difficulty” arises when unelected judges 
review the constitutionality of popular laws, striking some down and thus 
frustrating the will of the majority.336 Legitimacy and the difficulty go hand-
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in-hand. Invalidating laws can put political pressures on courts, whereas 
upholding laws might not. Because of this connection, we have already 
addressed the difficulty implicitly. Here we address it explicitly by arguing 
that active virtues do not make matters worse.  
If legitimacy depends in part on popularity, which depends in part on 
behaving in pro-majoritarian fashion, then judges are unlikely to use active 
virtues to behave in counter-majoritarian fashion. Simply put, a judge 
seeking legitimacy will not routinely frustrate democracy. We do not predict 
that judges always behave in pro-majoritarian fashion, just that judges 
exercising active virtues tend to.  
Suppose a court exercises active virtues and rules against the majority. 
If the court’s objective is legitimacy, and unless it miscalculates, then the 
decision must boost its legitimacy. Counter-majoritarian acts that grow 
judicial legitimacy do not seem like the kinds of acts that Bickel feared. 
Note that even as it rules against the majority, a court can mitigate the 
resulting pressure by avoiding a specific remedy. 337  This a common 
approach in countries like New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom 
where courts regularly let the government decide how to remedy an 
unconstitutional action.338 Softening remedies could be part of an active 
virtues strategy. In sum, we do not believe that the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty dooms active virtues in either its descriptive or normative sense.  
CONCLUSION 
Courts, Alexander Hamilton wrote, “have neither force nor will, but 
merely judgment.”339 This fits the traditional picture of (1) judges who wait 
passively for cases to arise and (2) resolve them by applying law to facts. 
Scholars have long challenged the second half of this characterization. They 
argue that judges do not (and often cannot) simply apply law to facts; they 
must exercise discretion. 340  We challenge the first half of the 
characterization. Judges do not passively wait—they seek out cases and 
initiate them. They use formal and informal mechanisms to do so. This is 
not necessarily a violation of the judicial ideal. On the contrary, by 
promoting courts’ legitimacy, active virtues make that ideal possible.  
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